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Surprisingly	   few	   papers	   have	   attempted	   to	   develop	   a	   direct	   empirical	   test	   for	   overbidding	   in	  
M&A	  contests.	  We	  develop	  such	  a	  test	  grounded	  on	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  profit	  maximizing	  
bidding	  behavior.	  The	  test	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  endogeneity	  concerns.	  Our	  results	  strongly	  support	  
the	   existence	   of	   overbidding.	  We	   provide	   evidence	   that	   overbidding	   is	   related	   to	   conflicts	   of	  
interest,	   but	   also	   some	   indirect	   evidence	   that	   it	   arises	   from	   failing	   to	   fully	   account	   for	   the	  
winner’s	  curse.	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The	  hubris	  hypothesis	  of	  Corporate	  Takeovers1	  provides	  a	  potential	   explanation	  of	   the	  
observed	  negative	  acquirer	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  (CARs)	  around	  mergers	  and	  acquisition	  
(M&A)	   announcements	   commonly	   reported	   during	   the	   eighties2.	   The	   explanation	   combines	  
bidding	   competition	   and	   valuation	   error.	   During	   the	   takeover	   contest,	   bidders	   compete	   to	  
acquire	  the	  target.	  The	  winner	  posts	  the	  highest	  bid.	  Because	  bids	  increase	  with	  assessments	  of	  
value,	  the	  winning	  bidder	  generally	  has	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  valuations.	  	  This	  is	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  
winner	   because	   part	   of	   the	   target	   value	   originates	   from	   valuation	   common	   to	   all	   bidders.	  
Participants	  in	  takeover	  contests	  should	  rationally	  anticipate	  the	  winners’	  curse	  and	  shade	  their	  
bids	  accordingly.	  If	  they	  do	  not,	  the	  ex-­‐post	  observed	  value-­‐effect	  of	  acquiring	  the	  target	  could	  
be	  negative3,4.	  	  	  
Numerous	  empirical	  papers	  continue	  to	  report	  negative	  acquirer	  CARs,	  at	  least	  for	  large	  
transactions	   involving	   listed	   targets	   (see	  Betton	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   for	   an	   extensive	   review	  of	  M&A	  
research).	   But	   negative	   acquirer	   CARs	   are	  not	   unambiguous	  proof	   of	   overbidding.	  Acquisition	  
announcements	   deliver	   information	   not	   only	   about	   the	   transaction	   itself	   but	   also	   about	   the	  
acquirer’s	   current	   condition	   and	   strategy	   (the	   revelation	   effect).	   Akdogu	   (2011),	   for	   example,	  
emphasizes	  that	  acquisitions	  can	  be	  undertaken	  in	  response	  to	  competitive	  pressures	  of	  which	  
the	   market	   is	   unaware	   prior	   to	   the	   bid.	   In	   such	   a	   circumstance,	   negative	   acquirer	   CARs	   are	  
compatible	   with	   value	   creating	   transactions	   because,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   transaction,	  
acquirers	  would	  have	  been	  even	  worse	  off.	  Wang	  (2015)	  develops	  a	  structural	  model	  based	  on	  
this	  intuition.	  The	  author	  estimates	  that	  M&As	  on	  average	  create	  value	  for	  acquirers	  in	  excess	  of	  
13%	  once	  the	  revelation	  effect	  and	  the	  acquirer	  run-­‐up	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  Even	  assuming	  
that	   acquisition	   announcements	   deliver	   only	   transaction	   level	   information,	   negative	   acquirer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Roll	  (1986)	  
2	  At	  that	  time,	  existing	  empirical	  studies	  had	  rather	  small	  samples	  of	  a	  few	  hundred	  large	  transactions.	  Since	  then,	  
newer	   investigations	  have	   focused	  on	   far	   larger	  numbers	  of	   transactions	   (e.g.,	   Fuller	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   These	   studies	  
show	  that	  negative	  acquirer	  CARs	  are	  observed	  mainly	  when	  targets	  are	  publicly	  traded	  firms.	   	  This	  accords	  with	  
the	  hubris	  idea	  that	  the	  observed	  market	  price	  of	  a	  target	  is	  an	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  value.	  	  
3	  When	  the	  target	  is	  a	  publicly	  traded	  company,	  the	  established	  market	  price	  already	  represents	  a	  de	  facto	  bid,	  so	  
an	  acquirer	  must	  have	  a	  valuation	  exceeding	  the	  market	  price.	  	  Even	  if	  there	  is	  only	  one	  acquirer	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  
market),	  the	  winner’s	  curse	  could	  still	  have	  an	  impact.	  
4	  Burkart	  (1995)	  develops	  an	  alternative	  auction	  theory	  based	  argument	  to	  explain	  overbidding.	  The	  author	  shows	  
that,	   in	   private-­‐value	   auctions,	   a	   bidder	  with	  partial	   ownership	  may	   rationally	   overbid	   and	   this	   overbidding	  may	  
lead	  the	  winning	  bidder	  to	  suffer	  from	  a	  net	  loss.	  
2	  
	  
CARs	   are	   not	   unambiguous	   evidence	   of	   overbidding.	   We	   show,	   in	   Appendix	   A,	   in	   a	   highly	  
stylized	   perfect	   information	   setup,	   that	   equilibrium	   bidding	   strategies	   are	   potentially	  
compatible	  with	  value	  destruction	  in	  industries	  with	  significant	  exit	  costs.	  
Bhagat	   et	   al.	   (2005),	   using	   a	   combination	   of	   probability	   scaling	   and	   intervention	  
methods,	  report	  that	  perceived	  value	   improvements	  are	  much	   larger	  than	  previously	  thought.	  
Comparing	   the	   deal	   value	   improvement	   to	   the	   toehold-­‐adjusted	   bid	   premium,	   the	   authors	  
conclude	  that	  bidders	  on	  average	  pay	  fair	  prices	  for	  targets.	  	  But	  positive	  acquirer	  CARs	  are	  not	  
irrefutable	   evidence	   of	   rational	   (shareholders	   value	  maximizing)	   bidding	   either.	   Even	   if	   CEOs	  
undertake	  transactions	  that	  create	  value	  for	  their	  shareholders,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  value	  
maximizing	  behavior,	   they	  might	  bid	   so	   that	  value	  creation	   is	   less	   than	  optimal.	   For	  example,	  
there	  could	  be	  substantial	  synergies	  in	  a	  particular	  proposed	  merger	  but	  the	  acquirer	  gives	  too	  
much	   of	   them	   to	   the	   target.	   Testing	   overbidding	   is	   therefore	   inherently	   challenging;	   this	  
explains	  probably	   the	   limited	  number	  of	  empirical	   studies	  addressing	   the	   issue.	  Moeller	  et	  al.	  
(2004)	   and	   Boone	   and	  Mulherin	   (2008)	   report	   evidence	   failing	   to	   support	   the	  winners’	   curse	  
predictions.	   But	   other	   contributions	   report	   results	   compatible	   with,	   or	   even	   supporting,	   the	  
hubris	   hypothesis	   (Berkovitch	   and	   Narayanan,	   1993;	   Hietala	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   in	   the	   Paramount	  
takeover	   case;	  Mueller	   and	   Sirower,	   2003;	   Eckbo	  and	  Thorburn,	   2009)5.	   The	  debate	   is	   clearly	  
still	  open.	  	  
Our	  paper	  develops	  a	  new	  direct	   test	  of	  overbidding.	  Our	   test	   relies	  on	   the	   first	  order	  
condition	   (FOC)	   of	   a	   bidder’s	   expected	   profit	   maximization,	   a	   significant	   step	   forward	   with	  
respect	   to	   tests	   of	   overbidding	   currently	   reported	   into	   the	   literature.	   The	   bidder’s	   expected	  
profit	  equals	   the	  sum	  of	   (a)	   the	  probability	  of	  a	  successful	  acquisition	  multiplied	  by	   the	  profit	  
conditional	  on	  acquisition	  and	  (b)	  the	  probability	  of	  failure	  multiplied	  by	  the	  costs	  of	  failure.	  The	  
probability	  of	  success	  is	   increasing	  in	  the	  bid	  premium,	  	   	  profits	  conditional	  on	  completion	  are	  
decreasing	   in	   it,	  as	   is	  the	  probability	  of	   failure6.	  Value	  maximizing	  acquirers	  select	  the	  optimal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Malmendier	  and	  Lee	  (2011)	  report	  also	  clear	  evidences	  of	  irrational	  bidding	  in	  the	  context	  of	  online	  auctions,	  due	  
to	  limited	  attention.	  
6	  Note	   that	   costs	   of	   failure,	   as	   defined	   here,	   are	   exogenous	   to	   the	   bid	   premium	   because	   they	   are	   essentially	  
competitive	   and	   loss	   of	   investment	   opportunities	   costs	   (see	   e.g.	   Akdogu,	   2011).	  We	   use	   estimates	   provided	   in	  
Savor	  and	  Lu	   (2009)	  and	  Wang	   (2015).	  These	  estimates	  are	  based	  on	  samples	  of	  exogenously	   failed	   transactions	  
and	  are	  thus	  immune	  to	  potential	  endogeneity	  between	  costs	  of	  failure	  and	  bid	  premium.	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bid	   premium	   by	   trading	   off	   these	   effects.	   Therefore,	   if	   the	   bid	   premium	   is	   guided	   by	   value	  
maximization,	   the	   derivative	   of	   acquirer	   expected	   profits	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   bid	   premium	  
should	  be	  equal	  to	  zero	  on	  average.	  We	  introduce	  a	  direct	  test	  of	  this	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
profit	  maximizing	  bidding	  behavior.	  
Implementing	  an	  empirical	  test	  of	  this	  proposition	   is	  challenging	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  
the	  probability	  of	  success	  is	  not	  directly	  observable.	  Using	  the	  ex-­‐post	  observed	  outcome	  is	  not	  
an	  option.	  Bids	  are	  chosen	  endogenously	  based	  on	  a	  prior	  assessment	  of	  completion.	  Thus,	  a	  
high	  bid	  premium	  could	  conceivably	  be	  positively	  associated	  with	  a	  high	  failure	  rate	  ex-­‐post.	  We	  
follow	  on	   Bhagat	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   to	   build	   a	   proxy	   for	   the	   ex-­‐ante	   probability	   of	   success	   using	   a	  
probit	  specification	  and	  a	  large	  set	  of	  publicly	  observable	  determinants,	  selected	  by	  Betton	  et	  al.	  
(2014).	   	  While	  we	   are	   aware	   that	   any	   proxy	   suffers	   from	   shortcomings,	  we	   believe	   that	   it	   is	  
positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  unobservable	  true	  probability	  of	  success.	  Our	  test	  is	  constructed	  
so	  that	  the	  weaker	  the	  precision	  of	  this	  proxy	  (the	  higher	  its	  standard	  error),	  the	  less	  likely	  our	  
test	  will	  reject	  rational	  bidding.	  Hence,	  the	  test	  is	  therefore	  conservative.	  	  
Our	   second	   challenge	   arises	   from	   the	   obvious	   correlation	   between	   the	   probability	   of	  
success	  and	  bidder	  returns,	  both	  being	  outcomes	  of	  the	  acquirer’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  
program.	   The	   bid	   premium	   (the	   decision	   variable)	   chosen	   by	   bidder	   drives	   both	   the	   target	  
shareholders’	  reaction	  (probability	  of	  success)	  and	  the	  investors’	  reaction	  (bidder	  returns).	  We	  
take	   into	   account	   of	   this	   source	   of	   correlation	   with	   a	   seemingly	   unrelated	   equations	   (SUR)	  
estimator.	   The	   test	   of	   the	   acquirer’s	   FOC	   is	   implemented	   as	   a	   cross-­‐equation	   restriction	  
evaluated	   at	   estimated	   coefficients.	   To	   the	   best	   of	   our	   knowledge,	   this	   paper	   is	   the	   first	   to	  
introduce	  such	  a	  test	  procedure.	  	  	  
Our	   empirical	   results	   rely	   on	   a	   sample	   of	   1935	   completed7	  acquisition	   between	   U.S.	  
listed	  bidders	  and	  targets	  during	  the	  period	  1994	  to	  2014.	  The	  average	  deal	  size	   is	  USD	  2,342	  
million.	  The	  average	   three	  day	  bidder	  CAR	   is	   -­‐1.38%	  (strongly	  affected	  by	   the	   internet	  bubble	  
period)	  and	  the	  average	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premiums	  is	  42.27%,	  similar	  to	  results	  reported	  in	  previous	  
studies	   for	  public	   target	   takeover	  contests	   (see	  Betton	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  For	  each	  observation,	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 	  We	   limit	   our	   sample	   to	   completed	   transactions	   because	   SEC	   filings	   are	   most	   frequently	   unavailable	   for	  
uncompleted	  transaction.	  This	  sample	  restriction	  doesn’t	  affect	  our	  test	  because	  it	  is	  the	  investor	  perception	  of	  the	  
probability	  of	  deal	  completion	  at	  the	  deal	  announcement	  that	  matters.	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compute	   the	   three-­‐day	   bidder	   CAR	   (using	   the	   standard	   market	   model	   as	   return	   generating	  
process)	  and	  scale	  them	  by	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  (Bhagat	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  to	  obtain	  a	  proxy	  of	  
bidder	  expected	  profits.	  The	  estimated	  probability	  of	  success	  is	  itself	  obtained	  using	  the	  Betton	  
et	   al.	   (2014)	   probit	  model	   estimated	   on	   a	   very	   large	   sample	   of	   completed	   and	   uncompleted	  
acquisition	  attempts.	  We	  collect	  a	   large	   set	  of	  previously-­‐studied	  determinants	  of	  bidder	  CAR	  
and	   probability	   of	   success	   from	   the	   CRSP,	   Compustat	   and	   SDC	   databases.	   We	   also	   collect	  
information	   in	   Security	   Exchange	   Commission	   (SEC)	   filings	   (in	   particular,	   deal	   initiation	   and	   a	  
description	  of	  the	  selling	  process)	  in	  order	  to	  include	  known	  determinants	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  
success	  and	  bidder	  returns,	  controlling	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  for	  endogenous	  omitted	  variables.	  	  
On	   average,	   our	   results	   reject	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   bids	   satisfy	   the	   FOC	   of	   expected	  
profits	  maximization.	  Statistical	  significance	  exceeds	  the	  1%	  threshold	  in	  most	  tests.	  Moreover,	  
the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  bid	  premium	  in	  the	  bidder	  returns	  and	  probability	  of	  success	  equations	  
display	   the	   expected	   signs	   (negative	   in	   the	   former	   case	   and	   positive	   in	   the	   latter)	   and	   are	  
statistically	  significant,	  buttressing	  the	  view	  that	  our	  empirical	  proxies	  (the	  acquirer	  CAR	  and	  the	  
estimated	   probability	   of	   success	   respectively)	   are	   relevant.	   Thus,	   we	   conclude	   that	   there	   is	  
significant	  overbidding	  on	  average.	  Overbidding	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  construct.	  	  
We	  check	  the	  robustness	  of	  this	  result	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  We	  start	  by	  investigating	  whether	  
a	  mis-­‐specification	  of	  the	  functional	   form	  of	  our	   linear	  SUR	  drives	  the	  FOC	  test	  result.	  Using	  a	  
non-­‐linear	  SUR	  specification	  based	  on	  bid	  premium	  terms	  up	  to	  the	  order	  three,	  we	  confirm	  the	  
FOC	   rejection	   at	   a	   high	   level	   of	   statistical	   significance	   over	   almost	   the	   whole	   range	   of	   bid	  
premiums	  observed	  in	  our	  sample.	  	  	  We	  next	  replicate	  the	  analysis	  without	  using	  the	  Bhagat	  et	  
al.	  (2005)	  probability	  scaling	  procedure	  and	  obtain	  similar	  results.	  We	  also	  replicate	  the	  analysis	  
dropping	   from	   the	   SUR	   specification	   all	   variables	   that	   are	   not	   statistically	   significant	   in	   our	  
baseline	   model.	   This	   asymmetric	   SUR	   specification	   leads	   to	   the	   same	   conclusions.	   Explicitly	  
taking	  into	  account	  heteroskedasticity	  also	  confirms	  our	  results.	  	  	  
Next,	  we	   study	   the	  potential	   consequences	  of	   risk	  aversion	  on	  our	   conclusion,	  using	  a	  
CARA	  utility	  function	  to	  model	  the	  CEO	  risk	  aversion.	  Introducing	  risk	  aversion	  leads	  to	  rejecting	  
even	  more	  strongly	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  FOC.	  We	  introduce	  an	  alternative	  
estimation	   strategy	   based	   on	   a	   parametric	   model	   of	   the	   joint	   density	   of	   bidder	   profit	   and	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probability	  of	  success.	  We	  choose	  the	  truncated	  bivariate	  normal	  density	   to	  explicitly	  account	  
for	   probabilities	   being	   bounded	   between	   0	   and	   1,	   a	   potential	   source	   of	   bias	   using	   the	   SUR	  
estimator.	  We	  estimate	  coefficients	  using	  the	  maximum	  likelihood	  (ML)	  estimator.	  The	  bidder’s	  
FOC	  is	  once	  again	  strongly	  rejected.	  	  
Finally,	  we	  also	  explore	   the	   robustness	  of	   the	   results	   to	  measurement	  errors	  affecting	  
our	  empirical	  proxies	  for	  bidder	  profits	  (the	  bidder	  CAR)	  and	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  (the	  
probit	   based	   estimates).	   Transaction	   announcements	   potentially	   deliver	   bidder	   private	  
information	  unrelated	  to	  the	  transaction	  itself.	  We	  control	  for	  private	  information	  revelation	  in	  
our	  baseline	  specification	  using	  two	  different	  control	  variables	   (the	  relative	  variation	  between	  
the	  pre	  and	  post	  announcement	  period	  of	   the	  Amihud	   (2002)	   illiquidity	   ratio	  and	  of	   the	  price	  
non-­‐synchronicity	   indicator	  (Roll,	  1988).	  To	  explore	  more	  in	  depth	  the	  potential	  consequences	  
of	   private	   information	   revelation,	   we	   identify	   a	   sub-­‐sample	   of	   transactions	   with	   low	   private	  
information	  revelation.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  overbidding	   is	  still	  present.	  We	  follow	  the	  same	  
strategy	   for	   the	   estimated	   probabilities	   of	   success	   by	   selecting	   a	   sub-­‐sample	   of	   transactions	  
perceived	  by	  investors	  as	  being	  almost	  certain	  to	  be	  completed	  (the	  stock	  price	  reaction	  is	  very	  
close	   to	   the	   announced	   bid	   premium).	   The	   estimated	   probability	   of	   success	   for	   these	  
transactions	  should	  be	  less	  prone	  to	  estimation	  errors.	  Overbidding	  is	  again	  confirmed.	  
Having	  established	   the	  presence	  of	  overbidding	   in	   the	  M&A	  market,	  we	   investigate	   its	  
sources.	   Overbidding	   may	   find	   its	   roots	   either	   in	   bidder	   irrationality	   (the	   bidder	   fails	   to	  
anticipate	   the	  winners’	   curse,	   the	  hubris	  hypothesis	  argument)	  or	   in	  decision	  delegation	   from	  
shareholders	  to	  CEOs,	  the	  classic	  agency	  conflict	  (Berle	  and	  Means,	  1932).	  	  
Agency	  conflicts	  potentially	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  case	  of	  M&A	  decisions	  because	  
CEOs	  are	  known	  to	  be	  key	  decision	  makers	  in	  acquisitions	  (Harding	  and	  Rovit,	  2004).	  CEOs	  may	  
willingly	  pursue	  other	  goals	  then	  shareholder	  value	  maximization,	  e.g.	  private	  benefits	  (Mork	  et	  
al.,	   1990),	   or	   simply	   be	  more	   risk	   averse	   than	   shareholders	   and	   seek	   diversification	   (Becker,	  
2006;	  Gormley	  and	  Matsa,	  2016).	  We	   first	   focus	  on	   the	  agency	  conflict	   source	  of	  overbidding	  
and	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  determinants	  suggested	  in	  the	  literature.	   In	  a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  805	  deals	  
for	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  collect	  these	  necessary	  information,	  we	  find	  that	  overbidding	  increases	  
with	  bidder	  past	  performance	  and	  bidder	  CEO	  entrenchment	  while	   it	  decreases	  with	   leverage	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and	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   toehold.	   We	   also	   observe	   that	   overbidding	   is	   stronger	   in	   horizontal	  
mergers	   and	   when	   the	   target	   size	   is	   high	   relative	   the	   bidder	   size	   	   but	   weaker	   in	   hostile	  
transactions	  (this	  surprising	  result	  rests	  on	  few	  observations)	  and	  in	  negotiation	  (as	  expected)	  	  
We	   explore	   differences	   in	   overbidding	   among	   industries.	   Among	   high-­‐technology,	  
manufacturing,	  and	  financial	  industries,	  overbidding	  appears	  to	  be	  stronger	  in	  high-­‐technology.	  
But	   statistical	   significance	   disappears	   once	   we	   control	   for	   bidder	   governance	   variables,	  
indicating	  that	  systematic	  differences	  in	  governance	  mechanisms	  between	  industries	  drive	  this	  
result.	  
We	  next	  attempt	  to	  test	  whether	  overbidding	  is	  related	  to	  irrationality	  or	  some	  form	  of	  
cognitive	  bias.	  The	  existence	  of	  CEO	  overconfidence	  and	  narcissism	  has	  been	  well	  documented	  
in	  the	  literature	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Hambrick,	  2007	  and	  2011;	  Malmendier	  and	  Tate,	  2008;	  Aktas	  et	  
al.,	   2016).	  We	   follow	   Aktas	   et	   al.	   (2016)	   and	   use	   the	   narcissism	   first	   pronoun	   indicator	   (the	  
proportion	  of	   first	  person	  singular	  pronoun	  to	  first	  person	  plural	  pronoun)	  to	  characterize	  the	  
degree	  of	  CEO	  narcissism.	  Using	  the	  de	  Bodt	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  extended	  data	  set,	  we	  are	  in	  position	  
to	   collect	   the	   CEO	   narcissism	   first	   pronoun	   indicator	   for	   174	   out	   of	   the	   805	   transactions	   for	  
which	  overbidding	  determinants	  are	  available.	  CEO	  narcissism	  appears	  to	  reinforce	  overbidding	  
but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  usual	  levels	  of	  confidence.	  Whether	  this	  is	  due	  
to	  the	   limited	  sample	  for	  which	  the	  narcissism	  first	  pronoun	  indicator	   is	  available	  or	  simply	  to	  
absence	  of	  irrational	  overbidding	  related	  to	  this	  personality	  trait	  deserves	  more	  investigations	  in	  
the	  future.	  	  
Finally,	  we	   adopt	   an	   alternative	   indirect	   empirical	   strategy	   to	   test	   for	   the	   presence	  of	  
irrational	  bidding	  due	  to	  not	   (fully)	  considering	  the	  winner’s	  curse.	   If	  overbidding	   is	   related	  to	  
this	   source	   of	   irrational	   behavior,	   bidders	   losing	   the	   competition	   to	   acquire	   targets	   should	  
display	   less	   (if	   not	   no)	   overbidding.	   Losing	   bidders	   may	   indeed	   be	   bidding	   less	   aggressively	  
because	   they	   more	   fully	   take	   into	   account	   the	   winner’s	   curse.	   Under	   the	   winner’s	   curse	  
explanation	  of	  irrational	  bidding,	  we	  should	  therefore	  observe	  weaker	  (or	  absence	  of)	  rejection	  
of	   the	   FOC	  of	   rational	   bidding	   for	   losing	   bidders.	  We	   test	   this	   prediction	   on	   a	   sample	   of	   545	  
failed	   transactions.	   The	   FOC	   is	   not	   rejected	   for	   these	   bidders	   ,	   essentially	   because	   the	   bid	  
premium	  is	  not	  negatively	  related	  to	  the	  bidder	  (scaled)	  CAR.	  This	  result	  is	  not	  sufficient	  in	  itself	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to	   conclude	   that	   failing	   to	   account	   for	   the	  winner’s	   curse	   explains	   irrational	   bidding	   but	   it	   is	  
consistent	  with	  such	  a	  possibility.	  
	  
	   Our	  paper	  contributes	  to	  different	  streams	  of	  literature.	  The	  first	  is	  behavioral	  corporate	  
finance.	   Roll	   (1986)	   introduced	   the	   possibility	   that	   irrational	   behavior	   could	   lead	   to	   poor	  
corporate	  performances.	  A	   large	  body	  of	   literature	  developed	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   this	   intuition.	   In	  
the	   M&A	   field,	   Hayward	   and	   Hambrick	   (1997),	   Chatterjee	   and	   Hambrick	   (2007,	   2011),	  
Malmendier	   and	   Tate	   (2008),	   Aktas	   et	   al.	   (2016)	   study	   the	   role	   of	   hubris,	   narcissism	   and	  
overconfidence.	   Overbidding	   behavior	   must	   be	   observed	   empirically	   for	   these	   psychological	  
biases	  to	  affect	  acquisition	  shareholder	  value	  creation.	  The	  second	  research	  field	  to	  which	  our	  
results	  contribute	  is	  auction	  theory	  and	  its	  applications.	  The	  winners’	  curse	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  
extensive	  analyses	  (Krishna,	  2010).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  overbidding	  behavior,	  its	  relevance	  could	  
be	  questioned.	  By	  showing	  that	  overbidding	  affects	  the	  M&A	  market,	  a	  fundamental	  resources	  
allocation	   mechanism	   in	   the	   economy,	   we	   confirm	   that	   the	   winner’s	   curse	   is	   a	   potential	  
candidate	  to	  explain	  irrational	  bidding	  behavior	  here	  also.	  The	  third	  stream	  to	  which	  our	  paper	  
contributes	  is	  the	  M&A	  literature	  itself.	  Value	  creation	  and	  its	  repartition	  between	  bidders	  and	  
targets	   have	   been	   central	   issues	   for	   more	   than	   30	   years	   (Betton	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Overbidding	  
directly	  affects	  the	  sharing	  of	  values	  between	  parties,	  whether	  it	  originates	  from	  irrationality	  or	  
agency	  conflicts.	  Because	  ex-­‐post	  we	  observe	  only	  winners	  of	  takeover	  contests,	  those	  who	  are	  
the	   most	   likely	   bidding	   beyond	   reason,	   and	   because	   overbidding	   behavior	   is	   conceivably	  
correlated	  with	  other	  bidder	  characteristics,	   ignoring	  the	  existence	  of	  overbidding	  may	  lead	  to	  
erroneous	  interpretation	  of	  empirical	  findings.	  	  	  
	   The	  paper	  has	  three	  main	  sections.	  The	  first	  is	  dedicated	  to	  our	  test	  of	  overbidding.	  	  The	  
second	  investigates	  the	  robustness	  of	  overbidding	  evidence	  to	  various	  issues.	  The	  third	  section	  
explores	  potential	  determinants	  of	  overbidding.	  	  	  
	  
Section	  1	  –	  The	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  
	   We	   first	   motivate	   our	   testing	   procedure.	   We	   then	   describe	   its	   implementation.	   We	  




1.1. 	  Shareholders’	  value	  maximizing	  bidding	  behavior	  
	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   irrational	   behavior	   and/or	   agency	   conflicts,	   the	   CEO	  will	   choose	   an	  
equilibrium	   bidding	   strategy	   to	   acquire	   the	   target	   in	   order	   to	   maximize	   shareholders’	   value	  
creation.	  The	  risk	  neutral8	  CEO	  maximization	  program	  takes	  the	  following	  form:	  
	  
	   max𝐸!"# 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 =	  Pr  (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)×𝐸 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +   (1−   Pr  (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠))×𝐸 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 	  (1)	  
	  
	  
where	  𝐸(  )	  stands	   for	   expectation,	  Pr(  )	  for	   probability	   and	  𝐸      )	  for	   conditional	   expectation	   .	  
The	  Bidder’s	  Profit	  is	  the	  transaction	  specific	  value	  creation.	  Success	  indicates	  that	  the	  deal	  will	  
be	  completed	  and	  Failure,	  the	  opposite	  outcome.	  Synergies	  designate	  value	  created	  specifically	  
thanks	   to	   the	   acquisition	   and	   any	   economic	   benefits	   that	   accrue	   to	   the	   acquirer,	   such	   as	  
pressure	  put	  on	  competitors	  (Akdogu,2011);	  Bid	   is	  the	  target	  shareholders	  payment	   in	  case	  of	  
success,	  whatever	  the	  form;	  and	  Costs,	   the	   loss	  of	  value	   in	  case	  of	  failure	  (due	  to	  competitive	  
effects	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  investment	  opportunities)9.	  The	  corresponding	  first	  order	  condition	  is:	  
	  
	  !  ! !"##$!!!  !"#$%&!  !"# =	  ! !" !"##$%%!  !"#   ×  𝐸 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +	    !" !"#$%&'$(!!"# !"##$%%!  !"#   ×   Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 	  +  ! (!!!" !"##$%% )!  !"#   ×  𝐸 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 0	  	  	   	   	   (2)	  
	  
	   We	   propose	   to	   test	   Equation	   (2)	   as	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   shareholders’	   value	  
maximizing	   bidding	   behavior.	   Violation	   of	   Equation	   (2),	   depending	   on	   the	   sign	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  We	  explore	  the	  consequences	  of	  CEO	  risk	  aversion	  in	  our	  robustness	  checks.	  
9	  	  Note	  also	  that	  taking	  failure	  costs	  explicitly	  into	  account	  is	  a	  way	  to	  control	  at	  least	  partially	  for	  revelation	  effects.	  
9	  
	  
!  ! !"##$!!!  !"#$%&!  !"# ,	   indicates	  either	  overbidding	  or	  underbidding.	  The	   test	   rests	  on	  ! !" !"##$%%!  !"# ,	  
the	   corresponding	   ! (!!!" !"##$%% )!  !"# 	  and	   !" !"#$%&'$(!!"# !"##$%%!  !"# , 	  the	   partial	   derivative	   of	   the	  
probability	   of	   success	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   bid,	   the	   corresponding	   partial	   derivative	   of	   the	  
probability	  of	  failure,	  and	  the	  partial	  derivative	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  profit	  conditionally	  on	  successful	  
acquisition,	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  bid.	  These	  three	  partial	  derivatives	  need	  to	  be	  estimated,	  
but,	   as	   ! (!!!" !"##$%% )!  !"# 	  	   is	   simply	  − ! !" !"##$%%!  !"# ,	   only	   two	   are	   required.	   Irrational	   bidding	  
originating	   from	  not	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  winner’s	   curse	   affects	   the	  bid	   and	   therefore	   the	  
probability	  of	  success,	  if	  other	  bidders	  don’t	  display	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  irrationality.	  Deviations	  
from	   the	  Equation	   (2)	   can	  also	  be	   caused	  by	  agency	   related	  motives,	   irrationality	   and	  agency	  
based	  explanations	  not	  being	  mutually	  exclusive.	  
We	  now	  describe	  our	  econometric	  specification,	  noting	  that	  bidder’s	  profit	  and	  probability	  
of	   success	   are	   correlated	   because	   both	   are	   driven	   by	   the	   bid	   premium,	   the	   bidder’s	   decision	  
variable.	  	  
	  
1.2. 	  Econometric	  specification	  	  
	   The	  test	  of	  Equation	  (2)	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  two	  equations	  system	  estimation:	  
	  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎! + 𝑎!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +   𝜀!	  	  	   	   (3)	  
	  Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 =   𝛽! + 𝛽!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 +   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +   𝜀!    	   	   (4)	  
	  
where	  𝜀! 	  and	  𝜀! 	  are	   regression	   errors	   and	  𝜀! 	  and	  𝜀! 	  are	   potentially	   correlated	   due	   to	   the	  
presence	  of	  omitted	  factors	  affecting	  both	  the	  bidder	  profit	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  .	  We	  
estimate	  the	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  using	  seemingly	  unrelated	  regressions	  (SUR).	  In	  our	  baseline	  
specification,	  we	  include	  the	  same	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  in	  Equation	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  which	  leads	  to	  
a	  symmetric	  SUR	  specification10.	  Point	  estimates	  in	  symmetric	  SUR	  specification	  are	  identical	  to	  
ordinary	   least	   square	   ones,	   but	   standard-­‐errors	   account	   for	   the	   correlation	   between	   errors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  We	  also	  report	  as	  a	  robustness	  check	  results	  of	  an	  asymmetric	  SUR	  specification	  into	  which	  only	  statistically	  
significant	  variables	  of	  the	  symmetric	  SUR	  specification	  are	  kept.	  
10	  
	  
(Greene,	   2011).	   	  𝛼!	  is	   our	   estimate	   of	  !" !"#$%&'$(!!"#|!"##$%%!  !"# 	  	   	   and	  𝛽!,  of	  ! !" !"##$%%!  !"# 	  (−𝛽!,  of	  ! !!!" !"##$%%!  !"# ).	  	  We	  test	  then	  Equation	  (2)	  as	  the	  following	  cross-­‐equations	  constraint:	  
	   𝛽!  ×  𝐵𝚤𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡 −   𝛽!  ×𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛼!  ×   Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 0  	  	   	   	   (5)	  
	  
where	  𝐵𝚤𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡	  and	  Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 	  are	  the	  sample	  mean	  estimates	  and	  average	  costs	  of	  
failure	  are	  from	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  and	  Wang	  (2015)	  The	  test	  follows	  a	  𝐶ℎ𝑖!	  distribution	  when	  
using	   the	   SUR	   estimator.	   The	   Equation	   (5)	   cross-­‐equations	   constraint	   tests	   the	   bidder	   profit	  
maximization	  FOC.	  This	   represents	  a	   significant	   improvement	  with	   respect	   to	  existing	   tests	  of	  
overbidding	  because	  (i)	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  Bidder’s	  Profit	  and	  the	  Pr(Success)	  is	  taken	  
into	   account	   and	   (ii)	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   these	   two	   components	   of	   the	   bidder’s	   expected	  
profit	  maximization	  program	  is	  explicitly	  modelled.	  
	  
1.3. Variables11	  	  
Bidder’s	  profit	  
	   Our	   proxy	   for	   the	   bidder’s	   profit	   is	   based	   on	   the	   classic	   bidder	   CAR,	   the	   investors’	  
reaction	  to	  the	  acquisition	  announcement.	  But	  bidder	  CAR	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  profit	  
(as	  perceived	  by	  investors)	  by	  the	  probability	  of	  completion.	  We	  therefore	  follow	  the	  Bhagat	  et	  
al.	   (2005)	   probability	   scaling	  method	   and	   divide	   Bidder	   CAR	   by	   the	   probability	   of	   success	   to	  
obtain	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR,	  our	  proxy	  of	  bidder’s	  profit12.	  We	  are	  aware	  that	  bidder	  CARs	  are	  
possibly	  contaminated	  by	  other	  information	  (in	  particular	  bidder	  private	  information	  revelation	  
due	  to	  the	  transaction	  announcement).	  We	  note	  first	  that	  our	  test	  relies	  on	  the	  estimation	  of	  𝛼!	  
in	   Equation	   (3),	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   bidder’s	   profit	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  bid,	   and	  not	   the	   level	   of	  
bidder’s	  profit	  itself.	  Contamination	  raises	  therefore	  only	  an	  issue	  if	  it	  is	  itself	  correlated	  to	  the	  
bid	  (becoming	  an	  endogenous	  measurement	  error).	  While	  such	  correlation	  cannot	  be	  generally	  
excluded,	  we	  introduce	  a	   large	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  to	  mitigate	  this	   issue	  (we	  examine	  also	  
the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results	  to	  private	  information	  revelation	  in	  complementary	  analyses.)	  CAR	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Appendix	  B	  provides	  the	  precise	  definitions	  and	  data	  sources	  of	  all	  the	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  empirical	  analysis.	  
12	  We	  replicate	  our	  results	  using	  the	  bidder	  CAR	  as	  proxy	  of	  bidder’s	  profit	  to	  check	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results.	  
11	  
	  
are	   obtained	   using	   the	   market	   model	   (MM)	   return	   generating	   process,	   using	   as	   estimation	  
window	  from	  day	  minus	  250	  to	  day	  minus	  10	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  announcement	  date	  and	  as	  
proxy	  for	  the	  market	  index,	  the	  CRSP	  value	  weighted	  index.	  CAR	  is	  the	  MM	  residuals	  sum	  over	  a	  
three	  days	  event	  window	  centered	  on	  the	  announcement	  date.	  	  
	  
Costs	  of	  failure	  
We	  use	  estimates	  of	  the	  average	  costs	  of	  failure	  reported	  in	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  and	  in	  
Wang	  (2015).	  These	  estimates	  rely	  on	  samples	  of	  exogenously	  failed	  transactions,	  mainly	  due	  to	  
regulatory	   interventions.	   Savor	   and	   Lu	   (2009)	   collect	   data	   over	   the	   period	   1978	   to	   2003	   and	  
identify	   148	   exogenous	   failed	   transactions,	   defined	   as	   transactions	   not	   connected	   to	   the	  
mispricing	  of	  the	  acquirer	  (a	  restricted	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  109	  transactions	  is	  also	  proposed	  by	  the	  
authors).	  We	   obtain	   estimated	   costs	   of	   failure	   of	   -­‐16.73%	  by	   taking	   the	  weighted	   average	   of	  
costs	  of	  failure	  for	  stock	  financed	  transactions	  (-­‐44.2%)	  and	  cash	  financed	  transactions	  (+9.3%)	  
obtained	  over	  a	  window	  going	  from	  announcement	  day	  minus	  one	  to	  announcement	  day	  plus	  
seven	  hundred	  fifty,	  as	  reported	  in	  Table	  VI	  of	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009).	  The	  Wang	  (2015)	  estimate	  is	  
based	   on	   a	   sample	   of	   143	   exogenous	   failed	   transactions,	   collected	   over	   the	   period	   1980	   to	  
2012.	   In	  Table	  3,	   the	  author	   reports	  a	  combined	   (bidder	  plus	   target)	  value	  destruction	  of	  9%,	  
65%	  of	  which	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  bidder,	  obtained	  using	  a	  window	  going	  from	  day	  minus	  one	  
to	  day	  plus	  one	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  announcement	  date.	  This	  leads	  to	  estimated	  costs	  of	  failure	  
of	  6.38%	  .	  	  
	  
Probability	  of	  success	  
	   The	   probability	   of	   success,	   which	   is	   driven	   by	   target	   shareholders’	   reaction	   to	   the	  
acquisition	   proposal,	   is	   not	   directly	   observable	   and	   the	   ex-­‐post	   observed	   outcome	  makes	   no	  
sense	  as	  a	  proxy.	  Even	  if	  the	  outcome	  is	  conceivably	  correlated	  with	  the	  probability	  of	  success,	  it	  
is	  fundamentally	  endogenous	  to	  the	  bid	  premium.	  The	  bidder	  may	  optimally	  decide	  to	  choose	  a	  
large	  premium	  when	  there	  is	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  failure.	  Consequently,	  the	  bid	  premium	  may	  
correlate	  ex-­‐post	  negatively	  with	  the	  probability	  of	  success!	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   We	  use	  as	  proxy	  of	  the	  ex-­‐ante	  probability	  of	  success	  the	  estimated	  probabilities	  from	  a	  
probabilistic	  model,	  as	  in	  Bhagat	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  	  The	  Betton	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  specification	  is	  selected	  
because	  it	  is	  more	  recent.	  This	  leads	  to	  estimate	  the	  following	  model:	  
	   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡   𝛼! + 𝛼!  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +   𝛼!  𝑁𝑦𝑠𝑒  𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑥 +   𝛼!  𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟+  𝛼!  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 +   𝛼!  52𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ +   𝛼!  𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 +   𝛼!  𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟+  𝛼!  𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 +   𝛼!  8−𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  𝐵𝑖𝑑  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 +   𝛼!"  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 +   𝛼!!  𝐴𝑙𝑙  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ+  𝛼!"  𝐴𝑙𝑙  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼!"  𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 +   𝛼!"  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  1990 	  
	   	  	  
(6)	  
	  
where	   Target	   Size	   is	   the	   logarithm	   of	   the	   target	  market	   value	   estimated	   42	   days	   before	   the	  
announcement	  date,	  Nyse	  Amex	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  listed	  on	  the	  
Nyse	   or	   the	   Amex,	   Turnover	   is	   the	   average	   daily	   ratio	   of	   the	   target	   trading	   volume	   to	   total	  
shares	  outstanding	  over	  the	  52	  weeks	  before	  the	  announcement	  date,	  Poison	  Pill	   is	  a	  dummy	  
variable	  taking	  value	  1	  if	  the	  target	  has	  a	  poison	  pill,	  52Weeks	  High	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  share	  price	  
42	  days	  before	  the	  announcement	  date	  to	  the	  maximum	  share	  price	  during	  the	  52	  weeks	  before	  
the	  day	  of	   the	  selected	  share	  price	   ,	  Toehold	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	   taking	  value	  1	   if	   the	  bidder	  
owns	  shares	  of	  the	  target	  before	  the	  deal	  to	  announcement,	  Listed	  Bidder	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
taking	  value	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  is	  a	  public	  company,	  Horizontal	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  1	  if	  
the	  bidder	  and	  the	  target	  share	  the	  same	  4-­‐digits	  primary	  SIC	  code,	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  the	  
8-­‐week	  bid	  premium	  winsorized	  at	  the	  one	  and	  ninety-­‐nine	  percentiles	   in	  some	  specifications,	  
Tender	  Offer	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  a	  tender	  offer,	  All	  Cash	  (All	  
Stock)	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	   taking	   value	   1	   if	   the	   payment	   is	   100%	   cash	   (stock),	  Hostile	   	   is	   a	  
dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  1	  if	  the	  target	  management	  responds	  negatively	  to	  the	  acquisition	  
proposal	  according	  to	  the	  SDC	  database	  and	  Year	  1990’s	   is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  1	   if	  
the	   deal	   is	   announcement	   during	   the	   period	   1994	   to	   1999	   to	   capture	   the	   internet	   bubble	  
episode.	  
	   To	   estimate	   coefficients	   of	   Equation	   (6),	   we	   collect	   a	   sample	   of	   5,780	   transactions	  
announced	  during	   the	  period	  1994	   to	  2014.	  The	   sample	   includes	  all	   transactions	  between	  US	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bidders	  and	  US	   listed	  targets,	  with	  a	  deal	  size	  above	  USD	  1	  million,	   for	  which	  the	  bidder	  held	  
less	   than	   50%	  before	   the	   acquisition	   attempt	   and	  more	   than	   50%	   after,	   reported	   in	   the	   SDC	  
database.	   Table	   1	   reports	   summary	   statistics	   by	   year.	   The	   end	   of	   the	   nineties	  M&A	  wave	   is	  
clearly	  apparent	  as	  well	  as	   the	  mid	  of	   the	  2000s.	  The	  average	  deal	  completion	  rate	   is	  80.07%	  
and	   the	   average	   8-­‐week	   Bid	   Premium	   is	   39.58%	   (with	   a	   corresponding	   median	   of	   33.43%).	  
Interestingly,	  the	  bid	  premium	  displays	  a	  significant	  time-­‐variation	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  related	  to	  
the	   internet	  bubble	  and	   the	   financial	   crisis	   episodes.	   These	   figures	  are	   in	   line	  with	  previously	  
reported	  statistics	  about	  the	  US	  M&A	  market	  activity	  (see	  Betton	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  
	   Table	  2	  reports	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  all	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  Equation	  (6)	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  test	  of	  difference	  of	  means	  between	  completed	  and	  uncompleted	  transactions.	  The	  sample	  
is	   composed	  of	   80.07%	   completed	   transaction	   (see	   Table	   1	   also),	   6.18%	   targets	   listed	   on	   the	  
Nyse	  or	  Amex,	  1.21%	  targets	  with	  poison	  pills,	  7.99%	  cases	  with	  toeholds,	  67.58%	  listed	  bidders,	  
32.80%	   horizontal	   transactions,	   16.73%	   tender	   offers,	   43.56%	   pure	   cash	   deals,	   27.06%	   pure	  
stock	  deals	  and	  2.92%	  transactions	  classified	  as	  hostile	  in	  the	  SDC	  database.	  The	  sample	  mimics	  
other	  large	  samples	  of	  U.S.	  transactions	  with	  public	  targets	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  (Betton	  et	  
al.,	  2008).	  The	  average	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   is	  39.58%,	  also	  consistent	  with	  figures	  reported	  in	  
such	  samples.	  The	  ratio	  of	  the	  price	  42	  days	  before	  announcement	  to	  the	  52	  weeks	  maximum	  is	  
65.94%,	  an	  indication	  consistent	  with	  bidder	  market	  timing	  behavior	  (Baker	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Tests	  
of	  differences	  of	  means	  provides	  some	   interesting,	  but	   familiar,	   insights:	   in	   the	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  
completed	  transactions,	  the	  proportions	  of	  targets	  protected	  by	  a	  poison	  pill	  and	  in	  which	  the	  
bidder	   has	   a	   toehold	   are	   smaller.	   All	   cash	   payments	   are	   also	   less	   frequent,	   as	   hostile	  
transactions.	  The	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  completed	  deals	  includes	  higher	  proportions	  of	  transactions	  by	  
listed	  bidders	  and	  of	  horizontal	  transactions.	  Completed	  transactions	  display	  also	  higher	  eight-­‐
week	  bid	  premium.	  We	  note	  finally	  that	  tender	  offers	  and	  all	  stock	  deals	  are	  more	  frequent	  in	  
the	   completed	   transactions	   sub-­‐sample.	   These	   results	   are	   globally	   consistent	   with	   previous	  
results	  reported	  in	  the	  literature	  (eg.,	  Betton	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Betton	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
	   Table	  3	  displays	  Equation	  (6)	  estimation	  results.	  Two	  specifications	  are	  reported:	  Column	  
(1)	   results	  obtained	  with	  the	  raw	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  and	   in	  Column	  (2)	  with	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  
Premium	  winsorized	  to	  one	  and	  ninety-­‐nine	  percentiles.	  We	  observe	  first	  the	  very	  high	  stability	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of	  our	  estimation	  results	  across	  the	  two	  specifications:	  all	  estimated	  coefficients	  keep	  their	  signs	  
and	  statistical	  significance.	  As	  intuitively	  expected,	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  
significant	  coefficient,	  consistently	  with	  Betton	  et	  al.	   (2014).	  To	  continue	  the	  comparison	   ,	  we	  
obtain	  the	  same	  coefficient	  signs	  and	  statistical	  significance	  for	  Target	  Size,	  target	  Nyse	  Amex,	  
target	  Poison	  Pill,	  52Weeks	  High,	  bidder	  Toehold,	  Listed	  Bidders,	  Horizontal	  deal,	  Tender	  Offer,	  
All	   Cash	   deal	   ,	   All	   Stock	   deal	   and	   Hostility.	   Switching	   from	   the	   univariate	   (Table	   2)	   to	   the	  
multivariate	   (Table	   3)	   context	   brings	   only	   some	   limited	   differences	   (Horizontal	   	   transactions	  
appear	  not	   anymore	  more	  probable	   to	  be	   successful	   and	  52Weeks	  High	  becomes	   statistically	  
significant	   in	  the	  this	  multivariate	  setup).	  We	  use	  estimated	  coefficients	   from	  Table	  3	  to	  build	  
our	  probit	  based	  proxy	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  success.	  	  
	   To	   validate	   our	   implementation	   of	   the	   probability	   scaling	   method,	   we	   replicate	   the	  
Bhagat	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   test	   of	   overbidding	   (as	   reported	   in	   their	   Table	   9).	   The	   authors	   check	  
whether	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  transaction	  value	  improvement	  and	  the	  toehold-­‐adjusted	  
bid	  premium	  is	  significantly	  negative.	  Their	  results	  show	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  after	  rescaling	  the	  
acquirer	  CAR.	  We	  obtain	  similar	  results	  (unreported).	  But,	  even	  if	  this	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  
for	  value	  maximizing	  bidding	  behavior,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  one;	  although	  they	  may	  share	  in	  the	  
value	  created,	  acquirers	  may	  (willingly	  or	  unwillingly)	  concede	  too	  much	  to	  target	  shareholders.	  
	   We	   note	   that	   the	   noisiness	   of	   the	   estimated	   probability	   of	   success	   plays	   against	   the	  
cross-­‐equations	  constraint	  test	  rejection.	  Indeed,	  a	  noisy	  estimate	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  
translates	   into	   large	  𝜀!	  values	   in	   Equation	   (4),	   leading	   to	   a	   large	  𝛽!	  coefficient	   standard-­‐error.	  
And	   this	   large	  𝛽!	  coefficient	   standard-­‐error	   enters	   directly	   into	   the	   cross-­‐equations	   constraint	  
test	   standard-­‐error.	   This	   effect	   reduces	   the	   probability	   of	   rejecting	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	  
rational	   bidding	   (the	   FOC	   statistic	   is	   equal	   to	   zero).	   So,	   our	   approach	   is	   conservative	   in	   that	  
respect.	  We	  report	  also	  results	  for	  sub-­‐samples	  of	  transactions	  perceived	  as	  almost	  certain	  by	  






	   We	  follow	  Betton	  et	  al.	   (2014)	  to	  compute	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium,	  which	   is	  obtained	  
as:	   8𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  𝐵𝑖𝑑  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = !""#$  !"#$%!"#$%!!!" − 1	  	   	   	   	   (7)	  
The	  offer	  price	  is	  itself	  collected	  in	  the	  SDC	  database	  and	  the	  share	  price,	  in	  the	  CRSP	  database.	  
	  
Control	  variables	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  variables	  included	  in	  Equation	  (6),	  we	  collect	  a	  large	  set	  of	  variables,	  from	  
both	  standard	  electronic	  databases	  and	  SEC	  filings:	  
	  
-­‐ From	   the	   CRSP,	   Compustat	   and	   SDC	   database,	   we	   compute	   the	   bidder	   market	   value	  
(Bidder	  Size),	  the	  target	  market	  value	  (Target	  Size)	  and	  CAR	   (Target	  CAR	   )	  and	  the	  deal	  
CAR	   (Deal	   CAR	   ),	   our	   proxy	   for	  Synergies13,	   using	   the	   same	   return	   generating	  process,	  
estimation	   window	   and	   event	   window	   as	   for	   bidder	   CAR.	   We	   add	   the	   target	   run-­‐up	  
(Target	  Runup)	  -­‐	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  target	  share	  price	  two	  days	  before	  the	  announcement	  
date	  to	  the	  target	  share	  price	   forty-­‐two	  days	  before	   it	  minus	  one,	   the	  target	  to	  bidder	  
relative	  size	  (Relative	  Size),	  the	  Horizontal	  dummy	  variable	  (equal	  to	  one	  it	  the	  acquirer	  
and	   the	   target	   share	   the	   same	   SIC	   4-­‐digits	   code),	   the	   Target	   Industry	   Liquidity	   ratio	  
(Schlingemann	   et	   al.,	   2002)	   in	   the	   SIC	   2-­‐digits	   target	   industry	   the	   year	   of	   the	  
announcement	   date,	   BidderPrivateR2	   and	   BidderPrivateAmihud	   –,	   proxies	   of	   the	  
revelation	  of	  bidder	  private	  information	  around	  M&A	  announcement,	  based	  respectively	  
on	  the	  residuals	  of	  the	  market	  model	  and	  the	  Amihud	  (2002)	  private	  information	  ratio.	  
All	  Cash,	  All	  Stock,	  Toehold	  and	  Hostile	  variables	  are	  collected	  in	  the	  SDC	  database.	  We	  
finally	  identify	  the	  number	  of	  bidders	  in	  the	  SDC	  database	  and	  code	  Multiple	  Bidder	  as	  a	  
dummy	  variable	  taking	  value	  one	  in	  case	  of	  multiple	  bidder’s	  contests.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Antoniou	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  show	  that	  deal	  CAR	  and	  the	  bid	  premium	  are	  correlated	  (correlation	  condition).	  Omitting	  
the	  deal	  CAR	  from	  our	  specification	  would	  therefore	  raise	  an	  issue	  of	  endogenous	  omitted	  variables	  because	  deal	  
CAR	  is	  also	  a	  determinant	  of	  the	  bidder	  CAR	  (relevance	  condition).	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-­‐ We	   collect	   in	   the	   SEC	   filings	   two	   variables:	   Initiation	   and	  Negotiation.	   These	   variables	  
influence	  directly	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  14.	  To	  obtain	  them,	  we	  use	  SEC	  filings	  DEFM	  
14A	  and	  S-­‐4	  for	  mergers	  and	  14D	  for	  tenders	  offers.	  Initiation	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  
value	  one	  if	  the	  target	  initiated	  the	  transaction.	  We	  follow	  Boone	  and	  Mulherin	  (2007)	  to	  
identify	   the	   sales	   process	   and	   code	  Negotiation	  with	   value	   one	   in	   case	   of	   one	   to	   one	  
negotiation	  and	  zero	   in	  case	  of	   (formal	  or	   informal)	  auction.	  Omitting	   Initiation	  and/or	  
Negotiation	   from	   our	   specifications	   would	   possibly	   induce	   an	   endogenous	   omitted	  
variable	  bias,	  but	  including	  them	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  significantly	  reducing	  the	  sample	  
size,	  because	  these	  variable	  are	  collected	  by	  hand.	  
	  
1.4. M&A	  Sample	  	  
	   We	  test	  Equation	   (5)	  by	  collecting	  a	  sample	  of	  1,935	  completed	   transactions.	  We	   limit	  
ourselves	   to	   completed	   transactions	   because	   SEC	   filings	   are	   most	   often	   unavailable	   for	  
uncompleted	  ones.	  This	  sample	  selection	  restriction	  doesn’t	  affect	  however	  our	  empirical	   test	  
because	   it	   is	   the	   ex-­‐ante	   probability	   of	   success	   that	   matters.	   Our	   proxy	   for	   the	   ex-­‐ante	  
probability	  of	  success	   is	   introduced	   in	  the	  previous	  section.	  We	  start	   form	  the	  sample	  used	   in	  
Aktas	  et	  al.	   (2010)	  and	  add	  the	  period	  2008	  to	  2014	  .	  The	  sample	  covers	  therefore	  the	  period	  
1994	   to	  2014.	  The	  starting	  1994	  year	  was	  chosen	  because	  SEC	   filings	  became	  available	   in	   the	  
electronic	  EDGAR	  database	  that	  year	  and	  we	  complement	  the	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  with	  the	  more	  
recent	  period	  to	  take	  into	  account	  years	  after	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  The	  sample	  is	  extracted	  
from	  the	  SDC	  database	  using	  the	  following	  criteria:	  the	  bidder	  and	  the	  target	  must	  be	  US	  listed	  
firms,	  the	  deal	  size	  must	  be	  at	  least	  USD	  100	  million,	  the	  bidder	  must	  old	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  
target	   shares	   before	   the	   transaction	   and	   more	   than	   50%	   afterwards	   (in	   most	   cases,	   the	  
percentage	  held	  after	  completion	  is	  in	  fact	  100%).	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  criteria	  generates	  a	  
sample	  of	   	  4,142transactions.	  SEC	  filings	  and	  the	  collection	  of	  variables	  required	  for	  Equations	  
(3)	   and	   (4)	   estimation	   has	   been	   possible	   1,935	   completed	   transactions.	   The	   sample	   size	  
shrinking	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  to	  collect	  Initiation	  and	  Negotiation	  in	  many	  SEC	  filings.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Note	  that	  Boone	  and	  Mulherin	   (2008)	   infer	   from	  the	  absence	  of	  relation	  between	  Bidder’s	  Profit	  and	  the	  sales	  
process	  that	  hubris	  is	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  bidder	  bidding	  behavior.	  The	  intuition	  is	  that	  the	  winner’s	  curse	  should	  be	  
more	  at	  play	   in	  auctions	   than	   in	  negotiation.	  But	  Aktas	  et	  al.	   (2010)	   shows	   that	  even	   in	   the	  case	  of	  negotiation,	  
latent	  competition	  pressures	  the	  bargaining	  parties.	  Negotiations	  are	  therefore	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  winner’s	  curse.	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But,	   this	   sample	   size	   still	   compares	   favorably	   to	   samples	   used	   in	   many	   previous	   academic	  
contributions	  using	  SEC	  filings	  information.	  
	   Table	   4	   displays	   descriptive	   statistics	   about	   the	   sample.	   The	   M&A	   waves	   of	   the	   late	  
nineties	  and	  mid	  of	   the	  2000s	  are	  again	  clearly	  apparent.	  The	  phenomenon	   is	  exacerbated	   in	  
deal	  value,	  mega	  M&As	  being	  observed	  in	  particular	  before	  the	  internet	  bubble	  burst(Moeller	  et	  
al.,	  2005)15.	  Bidder	  CAR	  are	  negative	  (-­‐1.38%),	  as	  expected	  for	  large	  transactions	  between	  listed	  
firms	   (Betton	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Target	   CAR	   are	   largely	   positive	   (22.47%)	   and	   our	   sample	   of	  
transactions	   are,	   on	   average,	   synergistic	   with	   an	   average	   Deal	   CAR	   of	   1.77%	   (with	   a	  
corresponding	  average	  Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	  of	  2.16%).	  The	  average	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  42.27%,	  
close	  to	  number	  classically	  reported	  for	  these	  kind	  of	  samples	  (Betton	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  The	  average	  
estimated	   Probability	   of	   Success	   is	   87.20%,	   which	   is	   somewhat	   higher	   to	   ex-­‐post	   observed	  
success	   rate	   (see	   Table	   1).	   This	   is	   to	   be	   expected	   because	   we	   focus	   here	   on	   successful	  
transactions.	   The	   Bidder	   Scaled	   CAR,	   our	   proxy	   for	   the	   bidder’s	   profit,	   is	   -­‐1.63%,	   strongly	  
affected	  by	  the	  internet	  bubble	  episode.	  	  
	  
1.5. Descriptive	  statistics	  
	   Table	  5	  summarizes	  descriptive	  statistics	  about	  the	  set	  of	  variables	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  
system	  of	  two	  equations	  defined	  by	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  and	  the	  statistical	  test	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  
expected	   profit	   FOC	   introduced	   in	   Equation	   (5).	   P-­‐values	   are	   only	   reported	   when	   the	   null	  
hypothesis	  of	  zero	  mean	  makes	  sense.	  As	  Table	  5	  list	  twentyvariables,	  we	  don’t	  comment	  them	  
all	  and	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  a	  few	  highlights.	  
	   Table	  5	  starts	  by	  reporting	  statistics	  on	  CAR,	  already	  reported	   in	  Table	  4,	  and	  adds	  the	  
Target	  Runup,	  positive	  (9.58%)	  and	  highly	  significant.	  The	  Probability	  of	  Success	   is	  87.20%.	  The	  
target	  to	  bidder	  Relative	  Size	  is	  27.45%%,	  an	  unusual	  figure	  (in	  most	  studies,	  the	  ratio	  of	  target	  
to	  bidder	   lies	  between	  10%	  to	  5%),	  but	   this	   is	  a	  consequence	  of	  our	   sample	  selection	  criteria	  
(minimum	  deal	  size	  of	  USD	  100	  million).	  40.57%	  of	  transaction	  attempts	  are	  Horizontal,	  37.36%	  
are	  All	  Stock,	  2.07%	  of	  the	  bidders	  hold	  a	  Toehold	  and	  0.88%	  of	  these	  transactions	  are	  classified	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  We	  note	  also	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  few	  mega	  M&As	  in	  2009	  (Pfizer	  versus	  Wyeth	  for	  USD	  68	  billion,	  Merck	  versus	  
Schering-­‐Plough	  for	  USD	  41	  billion,	  Exxon	  Mobile	  versus	  XTO	  Energy	  for	  USD	  40	  billion,	  etc),	  and	  in	  2014	  (Actavis	  
versus	  Allergan	  for	  USD	  68	  billion,	  Facebook	  versus	  Whatsapp	  for	  USD	  19.5	  billion,	  etc).	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as	  Hostile.	   Because	  BidderPrivateR2	  and	  BidderPrivateAmihud	  are	   variations	   between	   the	   pre	  
and	   the	  post	   announcement	  periods,	   numbers	   are	   themselves	  uninformative	  but	  we	  observe	  
that,	   according	   to	   these	   two	   proxies	   of	   private	   information,	   the	   bidder	   level	   of	   private	  
information	  decreases	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  acquisition	  attempt	  announcement,	  as	  expected.	  We	  
finally	  note	  that	  42.02%	  of	  the	  transactions	  in	  our	  sample	  are	  initiated	  	  by	  the	  target	  (Initiation	  
dummy	  variable)	  and	  that	  39.90%	  are	  classified	  as	  negotiations	  (Negotiation	  dummy	  variable).	  	  
	  
1.6. Results	  	  
Table	  6	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  system	  of	  two	  equations,	  defined	  by	  Equation	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  SUR	  
estimation	  results	  and	  the	  ensuing	  test	  of	  overbidding	  introduced	  in	  Equation	  (5).	  Columns	  (1)	  
and	   (2)	   show	   results	   using	   the	   raw	   8-­‐week	   Bid	   Premium,	   while	   in	   Columns	   (3)	   and	   (4),	   the	  
winsorized	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  used.	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (3)	  display	  results	  for	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  
CAR	  dependent	  variable	   (Equation	   (3))	  and	  Columns	   (2)	  and	   (4),	   for	   the	  Probability	  of	  Success	  
(Equation	  (4)).	  	  
The	  FOC	  tests	  of	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  strongly	  reject	  rational	  bidding,	  
with	  a	  𝐶ℎ𝑖!	  statistic	  of	  132.44	   (p-­‐value	  of	  0.00)	  and	  124.72	   (p-­‐value	  of	  0.00)	  using	   the	   raw	  8-­‐
week	  Bid	  Premium	  (Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)),the	  winsorized	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  (Columns	  (3)	  and	  
(4))	   and	   the	   Wang	   (2015)	   estimate	   of	   costs	   of	   failure.	   Using	   Savor	   and	   Lu	   (2009),	   the	  
corresponding	   figures	   are	   107.21	   and	   93.77,	   still	   with	   p-­‐values	   of	   0.00.	   The	   statistic	   point	  
estimates	   are	   all	   negative	   and	   comparable	   (between	   -­‐0.04	   and	   -­‐0.05),	   an	   indication	   of	  
overbidding	   (the	   slope	   of	   the	   profit	   function	   is	   negative	   and	   therefore,	   by	   bidding	   less,	   the	  
average	  profit	  would	  increase).	  The	  estimated	  coefficient	  of	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  negative	  
and	  highly	  significant	  in	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  regression	  (-­‐0.0541	  with	  p-­‐value	  0.00	  and	  -­‐0.0596	  
with	  p-­‐value	  0.00	  respectively	  in	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (3))	  and	  positive	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  
regression	  (0.0351	  with	  p-­‐value	  0.10	  and	  0.0543	  with	  p-­‐value	  0.00	  in	  Columns	  (2)	  and	  (4)).	  The	  
bidder	  trade-­‐off	   is	  clearly	  captured:	  bidding	  more	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  doing	  the	  deal	  at	  
the	   cost	  of	  decreasing	  profits	   in	   case	  of	  deal	   completion.	   These	   results	   take	   into	  account	   the	  
correlation	   between	   Bidder	   Scaled	   CAR	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   success,	   a	   key	   feature	   of	   the	  
chosen	  econometric	  approach.	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Some	   control	   variables	   also	   deserve	   comments:	   the	   Deal	   Scaled	   CAR	   coefficient	   is	  
positive	  and	  significant	  in	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  regression.	  Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	  being	  our	  measure	  
of	  synergies,	  this	  shows	  that	  bidders	  are	  able	  to	  capture	  part	  of	  the	  created	  economic	  value.	  Still	  
in	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  regression	  the	  Relative	  Size	  coefficient	  is	  negative	  and	  highly	  significant	  
while	  Boone	  and	  Mulherin	  (2008)	  report	  a	  negative	  and	  significant	  coefficient	  for	  Bidder	  Size	  but	  
an	  insignificant	  coefficient	  for	  Relative	  Size.	  Maybe	  some	  mechanic	  co-­‐linearity	  between	  Bidder	  
Size	   and	  Relative	  Size	   explains	   this	   variation	   in	   results	   (in	  our	   case,	  Bidder	  Size	   is	  positive	  and	  
highly	  significant).	  Continuing	  with	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  regression,	  Horizontal	  has	  a	  negative	  
sign,	   like	   in	   Boone	   and	   Mulherin	   (2008),	   but	   not	   statistically	   significant	   in	   our	   case,	   and	  
Negotiation	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  at	  the	  usual	  level	  of	  confidence,	  an	  intuitive	  result	  (even	  if	  
negotiations	  may	   be	   under	   pressure	   of	   implicit	   competition,	   as	   pointed	   it	   out	   in	   Aktas	   et	   al.	  
(2010)).	   We	   note	   finally	   that	   the	  Hostile	   coefficient	   is	   negative:	   hostile	   transactions	   are	   less	  
value	  creating	  for	  bidder,	  as	  intuitively	  expected	  (fighting	  against	  the	  incumbent	  management	  is	  
costly).	  
In	   the	   probability	   of	   success	   regression,	   	   the	   Bidder	   Size	   coefficient	   is	   positive	   and	  
significant	  (large	  bidders	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  complete	  transactions),the	  Relative	  Size	  variable,	  the	  
Horizontal	   dummy	  variable	   and	   the	  All	  Stock	  dummy	  variable	   coefficients	   are	  all	   positive	  and	  
significant,	   results	   that	   must	   be	   interpreted	   with	   care	   because	   potentially	   affected	   by	  
endogeneity	   (e.g.,	   paying	   in	   stock	   may	   be	   due	   to	   anticipating	   that	   the	   target	   will	   agree	   to	  
complete	  the	  transaction),	  while	  the	  Toehold	  dummy	  variable	  is	  negative	  and	  highly	  significant,	  
a	  result	  consistent	  with	  Betton	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Taking	  a	  toehold	  is	  apparently	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  
of	   aggression.	   Hostility	   decreases	   the	   probability	   of	   success,	   a	   result	   consistent	   with	   the	  
univariate	  evidence.	  Initiation	  appears	  to	  play	  a	  negative	  role	  but	  is	  only	  marginally	  significant.	  
Negotiation	   is	  negative	  and	  highly	  significant,	  an	   indication	  that	   target	  commitment	   to	  sale	   in	  
negotiation	  is	  weaker	  than	  in	  auction.	  	  
We	   obtain	   mostly	   the	   same	   results	   using	   the	   winsorized	   8-­‐week	   Bid	   Premium,	   as	  
displayed	  in	  Table	  6	  two	  right	  columns.	  Our	  results	  are	  clearly	  robust	  to	  the	  potential	  presence	  
of	  outliers	  in	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium.	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Figure	   1	   provides	   the	   FOC	   test	   histogram	   for	   the	   1,935	   transactions	   included	   in	   our	  
sample,	   corresponding	   to	   the	   8-­‐week	   Bid	   Premium	   and	   Savor	   and	   Lu	   (2009)	   costs	   of	   failure	  
estimates.	  The	  histogram	  is	  clearly	  centered	  in	  the	  negative	  range,	  with	  only	  a	  few	  observations	  
above	  zero.	  	  
	  
Section	  2	  –	  Robustness	  
	  
	   Section	  2	  is	  dedicated	  to	  a	  set	  of	  robustness	  checks.	  They	  address	  several	  potential	  miss-­‐
specification	  and	  measurement	  error	  issues.	  
	  
2.1.	  	   Linearity	  
A	   first	   potential	   misspecification	   that	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   incorrect	   finding	   of	   overbidding	  
bears	   on	   the	   SUR	   linearity	   specification	   in	   Equations	   (3)	   and	   (4).	  No	   theoretical	   development	  
grounds	  this	  choice	  and	  moreover,	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  linear	  probabilistic	  model	  for	  the	  probability	  
of	  success	  could	  raise	  concerns.	  We	  test	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  result	  to	  this	  potential	   issue	  by	  
adopting	  the	  following	  order	  three	  polynomial	  development	  in	  the	  bid	  premium16:	  
	  
	  	  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎! + 𝑎!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝑎!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 ! + 𝑎!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 ! + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +   𝜀!	  	  
	   	   (8)	  
	  Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 =   𝛽! + 𝛽!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 ! + 𝛽!  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 ! +  	  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +   𝜀!    	   	   (9)	  
	  
where	  𝜀! 	  and	  𝜀! 	  are	   regression	   errors.	   We	   estimate	   Equations	   (8)	   and	   (9)	   using	   seemingly	  
unrelated	   regressions	   (SUR)	   to	   account	   for	  𝜀! 	  and	  𝜀! correlation.	   Adopting	   this	   non-­‐linear	  
specification	   raises	   however	   a	   complication:	   the	  marginal	   effects	   are	   no	   longer	   constant	   but	  
depend	  on	  the	  bid	  premium.	  Indeed,	  the	  bidder	  profit	  partial	  derivative	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  bid	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  We	  get	  similar	  results	  with	  an	  order	  two	  development.	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premium	   is	  𝛼! + 2  ×  𝛼!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 + (3×𝛼!×  𝐵𝑖𝑑!)	  and	   a	   similar	   expression	   is	   obtained	   for	   the	  
probability	   of	   success.	   Consequently,	   the	   Equation	   (5)	   constraint	   test	   depends	   on	   the	   bid	  
premium:	  
	   𝛽! + 2  ×  𝛽!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 3×𝛽!×  𝐵𝑖𝑑!   ×  𝐵𝚤𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡 −    𝛽! + 2  ×  𝛽!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 +3×𝛽!×  𝐵𝑖𝑑!   ×𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛼! + 2  ×  𝛼!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 + (3×𝛼!×  𝐵𝑖𝑑!)   ×   Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 0  	  	  (10)	  
	  
In	   this	  non-­‐linear	   setup,	  a	  value	   for	   the	  bid	  premium	  must	  be	  chosen.	  To	  provide	  a	  complete	  
picture	   of	   the	   FOC	   test	   behavior,	   we	   report	   not	   only	   the	   non-­‐linear	   SUR	   estimation	   results	  
obtained	   at	   the	   sample	   average	   bid	   premium	   in	   Table	   7	   but	   also,	   in	   Figure	   2,	   a	   graphical	  
representation	   of	   the	   Chi2	   statistic	   and	   the	   bidder	   profit	   and	   probability	   of	   success	   partial	  
derivatives	  over	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  bid	  premium	  present	  in	  our	  sample.	  And,	  to	  be	  consistent,	  
we	  use	  fitted	  values	  of	  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟!𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡	  and	  Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 	  at	  corresponding	  bid	  premium	  values	  
and	  the	  mean	  of	  control	  variables.	  
	   We	  observe	   in	  Table	  7	   that	  estimated	  coefficients	  of	   the	  bid	  premium	   itself	  are	  highly	  
statistically	   significant	   in	   both	   the	   bidder	   profit	   equation	   (Column	   (1))	   and	   the	   probability	   of	  
success	  equation	  (Column	  (2)).	  Coefficients	  of	   the	  second	  order	  exponent	  of	   the	  bid	  premium	  
are	  also	   statistically	   significant,	  but	   less	   so	   in	   the	  bidder	  profit	  equation	   (p-­‐value	  of	  0.05)	  and	  
coefficients	   of	   the	   third	   order	   exponent	   are	   only	   significant	   in	   the	   probability	   of	   success	  
equation.	   	   But	  due	   to	   the	  non-­‐linear	   specification,	   these	   coefficients	  do	  not	  provide	  marginal	  
effects.	  We	  turn	  therefore	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  Figure	  2.	  	  
	   In	   Figure	  2	  –	  Panel	  A,	  we	  graph	   the	  Chi2	   statistic	  of	   the	  FOC	  constraint	   test	   (Equation	  
(10))	  obtained	  using	  the	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  estimate	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  failure	  and	  in	  Panel	  B,	  the	  
bidder	  profit	  (left	  vertical	  axis)	  and	  probability	  of	  success	  (right	  vertical	  axis)	  partial	  derivatives.	  
The	  horizontal	  axis	  reports	  the	  bid	  premium	  percentiles	   in	  our	  sample	   in	  both	  panels.	  Panel	  A	  
shows	  us	   that	   the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  value-­‐maximizing	  bidding	   (FOC	  equal	   to	   zero)	   is	   rejected	  
over	  almost	  the	  whole	  range	  of	   the	  bid	  premium.	   It	   is	  only	   from	  percentile	  100	  that	  the	  𝐶ℎ𝑖2	  
falls	  below	  3.84,	  its	  critical	  value	  at	  5%	  level	  of	  confidence,	  failing	  to	  reject	  the	  FOC	  test.	  Panel	  B	  
displays	   the	   corresponding	   evolution	   of	   the	   bidder	   profit	   and	   probability	   of	   success	   partial	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derivatives.	  This	  provides	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  inverted	  𝑈	  shape	  displayed	  in	  Panel	  A.	  
We	   observe	   that	   the	   bidder	   profit	   partial	   derivative	   is	   negative	   over	   the	  whole	   range	   of	   bid	  
premium	   (increasing	   the	   bid	   premium	   reduces	   the	   bidder	   profit	   conditionally	   on	   bid	  
completion),	   that	   it	   is	   increasing	  up	  to	  percentile	  98	   (the	  negative	   impact	   is	   itself	  decreasing),	  
before	  decreasing	  drastically	  in	  the	  last	  2	  percentiles	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  bid	  premium.	  An	  
inverse	   behavior	   is	   observed	   for	   the	   probability	   of	   success,	   which	   is	   positive	   over	   the	  whole	  
range	  of	  the	  bid	  premium,	  decreasing	  up	  to	  percentile	  97,	  and	  rising	  strongly	  in	  the	  right-­‐most	  
percentiles.	  Putting	  into	  correspondence	  Panel	  A	  and	  Panel	  B	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  negative	  marginal	  
effect	  of	  the	  bid	  premium	  on	  the	  bidder	  profit	  dominates	  the	  positive	  one	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  
success	   for	   the	  most	  part	  of	   the	  bid	  premium	  range.	  The	  right-­‐most	  behavior	  of	   the	  𝐶ℎ𝑖2	  test	  
statistic	  is	  apparently	  driven	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  transactions	  that	  strongly	  
influence	  the	  estimated	  bid	  premium	  partial	  derivatives	  and	  their	  relative	  importance.	  	  
We	  conclude	  from	  this	  analysis	  that	  the	  linear	  specification	  results	  are	  valid	  over	  almost	  
the	  whole	  range	  of	  bid	  premiums	  present	  in	  our	  sample.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2.2.	  	   Scaling	  
Another	   potential	   issue	   that	   could	   affect	   the	   robustness	   of	   our	   results	   is	   the	   scaling	  
procedure	  borrowed	  from	  Bhagat	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  The	  denominator	  of	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  and	  the	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   is	   indeed	  the	  estimated	  probability	  of	  success,	  from	  Equation	  (6).	  In	  the	  limit,	  
these	  probability	  estimates	  may	  go	  towards	  zero,	  generating	  extreme	  values	  for	  Bidder	  Scaled	  
CAR.	   We	   replicate	   therefore	   Table	   6	   estimations	   in	   Table	   8	   using	   unscaled	   bidder	   CAR	   and	  
unscaled	  deal	   CAR.	  Our	   results	   are	   almost	   unaffected	  by	   this	   change	   and	   the	   FOC	  of	   optimal	  
bidding	  is	  again	  strongly	  rejected	  in	  all	  specifications.	  
	  
2.3.	  	   Asymmetric	  SUR	  specification	  and	  Heteroskedasticity	  
One	  more	  potential	  source	  of	  concern	  is	  the	  symmetric	  SUR	  specification	  that	  we	  have	  
selected.	  We	  present	  in	  Table	  9	  results	  of	  an	  asymmetric	  SUR	  specification	  obtained	  by	  dropping	  
all	  statistically	   insignificant	  variables	  (at	  the	  10%	  confidence	   level)	   from	  the	  Table	  6	  estimated	  
regression	  equations.	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Because	  the	  previous	  estimation	  results	  assume	  homoskedasticity,	  we	  present	   in	  Table	  
10	  results	  taking	  into	  account	  heteroskedasticity	  (but	  at	  the	  price	  of	  a	  less	  efficient	  estimator17).	  	  
Results	  are	  once	  again	  highly	  stable	  and	  the	  FOC	  tests	  continue	  to	  strongly	  reject	  the	  null	  
hypothesis	  of	  optimal	  bidding,	  with	  negative	  point	  estimates.	  
	  
2.4. Risk	  aversion,	  probability	  of	  success	  truncation	  and	  costs	  of	  failure	  	  
Equation	   (1),	   which	   depicts	   the	   bidding	   CEO’s	   maximization	   program,	   relies	   on	   risk	  
neutrality.	   But	   CEOs	   are	   under-­‐diversified	   (Becker,	   2006;	   Gormley	   and	   Matsa,	   2016)	   and	  
therefore	  more	  risk	  averse	  then	  shareholders.	  This	  diversification	  wedge	  may	  be	  the	  source	  of	  
divergent	  CEO	  bidding	  relative	  to	  optimal	  bidding	  from	  the	  shareholders’	  perspective.	  To	  what	  
extent	  would	   this	   risk	  aversion	  wedge	  potentially	  affect	  our	   results?	  We	  explore	   this	   issue	  by	  
modeling	   CEO	   utility	   with	   a	   Constant	   Absolution	   Risk	   Aversion	   (CARA)	   function.	   Equation	   (1)	  
becomes:	  
	  max𝐸!"# 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = Pr  (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)×𝐸 −𝑒!!  (!"#$%&'$(!!"#)     𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 	  	   (11)	  
	  
with	  𝛾	  being	   the	   risk	   aversion	   coefficient.	   We	   follow	   the	   same	   approach	   as	   in	   Section	   1.1,	  
deriving	  the	  corresponding	  FOC	  and	  using	  the	  Section	  1.2	  econometric	  specification	  to	  test	  for	  
rational	  bidding	  for	  levels	  of	  𝛾	  ranging	  from	  1	  to	  10.	  Results	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  3.	  The	  FOC	  
estimates	  decrease	  monotonically	  with	  𝛾.	  This	  result	  is	  intuitive.	  A	  more	  risk	  averse	  CEO	  would	  
exhibit	  more	  conservative	  bidding.	  Therefore,	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  aversion,	  the	  lower	  should	  be	  
the	  level	  of	  rational	  bidding.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  ex-­‐post	  observed	  bidding	  and	  the	  ex-­‐
ante	  expected	  rational	  bidding	  becomes	  even	  more	  significant.	  Risk	  neutrality,	  as	  in	  Section	  1.1	  
to	  Section	  1.2,	  is	  therefore	  a	  conservative	  assumption.	  
	  
2.5. Truncation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   Another	   potential	   source	   of	  misspecification	   of	   our	   SUR	   econometric	   approach	   is	   the	  
truncated	   nature	   of	   the	   probability	   of	   success	   dependent	   variable,	   which	   is	   by	   definition	  
bounded	   between	   zero	   and	   one.	   	   We	   develop	   in	   this	   Section	   an	   alternative	   estimator	   of	  ! !" !"##$%%!  !"# 	  and	  !" !"#$%&'$(!!"# !"##$%%!  !"# ,	  the	   partial	   derivative	   of	   the	   probability	   of	   success	   with	  
respect	  to	  the	  bid	  and	  the	  partial	  derivative	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  profit,	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  bid,	  
taking	  into	  account	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  truncation.	  	  
As	   pointed	   out	   in	   Reiss	   and	   Wolak	   (2007),	   when	   modeling	   the	   interactions	   among	  
variables,	   the	   main	   object	   of	   interest	   is	   their	   joint	   density.	   From	   the	   joint	   density,	   one	   can	  
obtain	  marginal	  densities	  and	  conditional	  moments	  of	  interest	  by	  integration.	  We	  are	  interested	  
here	   in	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  bid	  premium	  on	  bidder	  profit	   and	  probability	  of	   success,	   taking	   into	  
consideration	  their	  correlation.	  Hence,	  we	  propose	  a	  direct	  parametric	  estimation	  of	  their	  joint	  
density	  using	  the	  truncated	  bivariate	  normal	  density.	  Denoting	  by	  𝑥	  the	  bidder	  profit	  and	  𝑦	  the	  
probability	  of	  success,	  we	  use	  the	  following	  specification:	  
	  
𝑓! 𝑥, 𝑦 = !!!!!!! !!!!!!
!! !!!!!!!!!  !  !!  !!!!!!
!(!,!)!!!!!!   !"  !" 	  	   	   (12)	  
	  
Where:	  
-­‐ 𝑓 𝑥,𝑦 = !!!!!!! !!!! 𝑒!!! !!!!!!!!!  !  !!  !!!!!! 	  is	  the	  bivariate	  normal	  density;	  
-­‐ 𝜀! = !!!!!! 	  and	   𝜀! = !!!!!! 	  are	   the	   standardized	   bidder	   profit	   and	   the	   standardized	  
probability	  of	  success	  respectively;	  
-­‐ 𝜇!	  is	  𝐸 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 .	  We	  condition	  this	  expectation	  on	  the	  bid	  premium	  and	  on	  the	  
whole	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  included	  in	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4):	  




-­‐ 𝜇!	  is	  𝐸(Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ).	  	  Again,	  we	  condition	  this	  expectation	  on	  the	  bid	  premium	  and	  the	  
same	  whole	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  as	  in	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4):	  
	   E(Pr 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) =   𝛽! + 𝛽!×𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠	  	   	   	   (14)	  
	  
-­‐ 𝜎!,	  𝜎!	  and	  𝜌	  are	   respectively	   the	   standard	   deviation	   of	   the	   bidder	   profit,	   the	   standard	  
deviation	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  and	  their	  correlation.	  
The	  truncation	  of	  𝑦	  accounts	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  is	  bounded	  between	  0	  
and	  1.	  Modeling	  the	  joint	  density	  of	  the	  bidder	  profit	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  allows	  us	  to	  
take	   into	   account	   their	   potential	   correlation	   because	   the	   truncated	   bivariate	   normal	   density	  
incorporates	   the	   correlation	  𝜌	  between	   variables.	   We	   estimate	   Equation	   (12)	   by	   maximum	  
likelihood	   and	   use	   the	   estimates	   of	  𝛼! 	  and	  𝛽! 	  and	   their	   standard-­‐errors	   to	   test	   the	   cross-­‐
equations	  constraint	  defined	  by	  Equation	  (5).	  
Table	  11	  reports	  our	  results.	  Column	  (1)	  displays	  coefficients	  and	  corresponding	  p-­‐values	  
for	  the	  bidder	  profit	  equation	  (using	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  proxy)	  and	  Column	  (2),	  the	  probability	  of	  
success	  (using	  Probability	  of	  success	  proxy	  from	  Equation	  (6)).	  In	  Column	  (1),	  the	  coefficient	  of	  
the	   8-­‐week	   Bid	   Premium	   (𝛼! )	   is	   negative	   and	   highly	   significant	   and	   in	   Column	   (2),	   the	  
corresponding	  coefficient	  (𝛽!)	   is	  positive	  and	  highly	  significant.	  As	  with	  the	  SUR	  estimator,	  we	  
capture	  again	  the	  trade-­‐off	  driving	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  bid-­‐premium:	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  probability	  
of	  success	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  bidder	  profit.	  The	  FOC	  test	  is	  strongly	  rejected	  (𝐶ℎ𝑖!	  
statistic	  of	  132.44	  with	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.00	  using	  the	  Wang	  (2015)	  estimate	  of	  costs	  of	   failure	  and	  𝐶ℎ𝑖!	  statistic	  of	  107.21	  with	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.00	  using	  the	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  one).	  The	  negative	  
estimates	   for	   the	   FOC	   	   supports	   again	   the	   overbidding	   interpretation	   of	   this	   rejection.	  
Concerning	  control	  variables,	  most	  keep	   their	   signs	  and	  statistical	   significance	  with	   respect	   to	  
Table	  6.	  We	  note	  that	  the	  estimated	  value	  of	  the	  covariance	  between	  the	  bidder	  profit	  and	  the	  
probability	  of	  success	   is	  positive	  and	  significant.	  Apparently,	  despite	  scaling	  the	  Bidder	  CAR	  by	  
the	  probability	  of	  success	  (as	  in	  Bhagat	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  and	  conditioning	  expectations	  on	  our	  whole	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set	  of	  control	  variables,	  the	  interaction	  between	  bidder	  profit	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  is	  a	  
relevant	  issue18.	  
	  
2.6. Measurement	  errors	  	  
Our	   baseline	   specification	   introduces	   two	   control	   variables	   for	   bidder	   private	  
information	  release	  around	  the	  announcement	  date:	  the	  relative	  variation	  between	  the	  pre	  and	  
the	   post	   announcement	   periods	   of	   the	   Amihud	   (2002)	   illiquidity	   ratio	   and	   of	   the	   price	   non-­‐
synchronicity	  indicatorPrivate	  information	  release	  caused	  by	  the	  transaction	  announcement	  is	  a	  
kind	   of	   measurement	   errors	   when	   using	   the	   bidder	   CAR	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   bidder	   transaction	  
specific	   value	   effect.	  We	   introduce	   in	   this	   Section	   an	   alternative	   approach	   to	   control	   for	   this	  
source	  of	  error	  by	  selecting	  a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	   transactions	  for	  which	  the	  bidder	   level	  of	  private	  
information	  is	  almost	  constant	  between	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  announcement	  periods.	  The	  selection	  
criterion	  is	  based	  on	  the	  price	  non-­‐synchronicity	  indicator	  ratio	  	  and	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	   0.95 ≤ !!!! !",!"!!!! !!",!!" ≤ 1.05	  	  	   	   	   	   (16)	  
	  
where	   1− 𝑅! !!",!!" 	  is	  the	  non-­‐synchronicity	  indicator	  estimated	  from	  day	  minus	  61	  to	  day	  
minus	  42	  relative	  to	  the	  announcement	  date	  and	   1− 𝑅! !",!" 	  is	  the	  corresponding	  indicator	  
estimated	  from	  day	  plus	  42	  plus	  day	  61.	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  select	  a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  339	  transactions.	  
	   Estimation	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  12,	  in	  the	  same	  layout	  as	  in	  Table	  6.	  Our	  baseline	  
results	   are	   confirmed:	   the	   FOC	   of	   rational	   bidding	   is	   strongly	   rejected,	  with	   a	   negative	   point	  
estimate	  (a	  sign	  of	  overbidding),	  significant	  bid	  premium	  coefficients	   for	  the	  bidder	  profit	  and	  
probability	  of	  success	  equations,	  displaying	  the	  expected	  signs.	  	  
	   A	   second	  potential	   source	   of	  measurement	   errors	   is	   the	   estimated	  probability	   of	   deal	  
completion.	   Even	   if	   we	   follow	   the	   Bhagat	   et	   al.	   (2005),	   our	   proxy	   of	   the	   probability	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  One	   might	   expect	   a	   negative	   covariance	   between	   bidder	   profit	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   success:	   the	   bidder	  
increases	   the	  probability	  of	   success	  by	  bidding	  more	  aggressively	  but,	   in	  doing	   so,	   concedes	  a	  higher	   fraction	  of	  
synergies	  to	  the	  target.	  However,	  a	  high	  bidder	  profit	  may	  signal	  an	  attractive	  opportunity	  and	  strongly	  motivate	  
the	   bidder	   to	   complete	   the	   transaction,	   a	   source	   of	   positive	   covariance	   between	   the	   bidder	   profit	   and	   the	  
probability	  of	  success.	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completion	  is	  by	  construction	  noisy.	  To	  test	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results	  to	  this	  potential	  issue,	  
we	  follow	  a	  strategy	  comparable	  to	  above.	  We	  select	  a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  transactions	  for	  which,	  by	  
construction,	  the	  source	  of	  estimation	  errors	  is	  reduced.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  we	  select	  the	  sub-­‐
sample	  of	   transactions	  perceived	  by	   investors	  as	  almost	   certain.	   The	   selection	   criterion	   is	   the	  
following:	  
	   0.975 ≤    !!!!!""#$ ≤ 1.025	  	   	   	   	   	   (17)	  
	  
where	  𝑝!!!	  is	   the	   stock	   price	   two	   days	   after	   the	   announcement	   date	   and	  𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	  is	   the	   offer	  
price.	  The	  sub-­‐sample	  is	  this	  time	  composed	  by	  643	  transactions.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  13,	  Table	  6	  
results	  are	  again	  strongly	  confirmed,.	  
	   We	  conclude	  from	  these	  two	  additional	  analyses	  that	  measurement	  errors	  are	  unlikely	  
to	  drive	  our	  results.	  
	  
Section	  3	  –	  Overbidding	  determinants	  
	   The	   test	   of	   overbidding	   in	   Section	   1	   delivers	   a	   natural	   avenue	   to	   explore	   overbidding	  
determinants.	   	   Equation	   (5)	   can	   be	   estimated	   on	   a	   transaction	   by	   transaction	   basis,	   using	  
coefficients	  𝛼!	  and	  𝛽!	  from	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  respectively.	  Collecting	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  and	  
Probability	  of	  Success,	  our	  proxies	  for	  bidder	  profit	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  (see	  Section	  
1.3),	   we	   can	   thereby	   measure	   the	   degree	   of	   overbidding	   for	   each	   transaction.	   CEOs	   may	  
willingly	  overbid	  because	  their	  utility	  function	  differs	  from	  shareholders’	  value	  maximization,	  a	  
topic	  that	  we	  already	  explore	  under	  the	  risk	  aversion	  point	  of	  view	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	   In	  
such	   case,	   overbidding	   finds	   its	   roots	   into	   agency	   conflicts.	   But	   CEOs	   may	   also	   unwillingly	  
overbid	   because	   they	   don’t	   take	   (fully)	   into	   account	   the	   winner’s	   curse	   (the	   argument	  
developed	   in	   Roll,	   1986)	   and,	   therefore,	   act	   irrationally.	   Moreover,	   these	   two	   sources	   of	  
overbidding	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  We	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  agency	  conflicts	  and	  irrationality	  
as	  driving	  factors	  of	  overbidding	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
3.1.	  Overbidding	  and	  Agency	  Conflicts	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   The	   existing	   literature	   suggests	   several	   potential	   overbidding	   determinants	   related	   to	  
agency	   conflicts	   and	   governance	  mechanisms:	   past	   performance	   (Rau	   and	   Vermaelen,	   1998),	  
CEO	  variable	  compensation	  (Grinstein	  and	  Hribar,	  2004),	  the	  Gompers	  et	  al.(2003)	  index	  (GIM)	  
that	  captures	  CEO	  entrenchment,	  free	  cash-­‐flow	  (Jensen,	  1986),	  leverage	  (Jensen	  and	  Meckling,	  
1976),	   CEO	   age	   (Yim,	   2012)	   and	   the	   CEO	   pay-­‐slice	   (Bebchuk	   and	   al.,	   2011)19.	   Overbidding	  
behavior	  may	   also	   depend	   on	   industry	   factors.	  We	   distinguish	   between	  manufacturing	   firms,	  
financial	   institutions,	  high-­‐technology	  firms	  and	  other	  firms.	  To	   identify	  high-­‐technology	  firms,	  
we	  follow	  Kile	  and	  Phillips	  (2009)	  and	  use	  the	  following	  list	  of	  3-­‐digits	  SIC	  codes:	  283,	  357,	  366,	  
367,	  382,	  384,	  481,	  482,	  489,	  737	  and	  873.	  	  	  Manufacturing	  firms	  are	  firms	  that	  belong	  to	  SIC	  4-­‐
digits	   3000	   to	   3999	   (at	   the	   exclusion	   of	   codes	   associated	   with	   high-­‐technology	   firms)	   and	  
financial	  institutions	  are	  institutions	  belonging	  	  to	  SIC	  4-­‐digits	  6000	  to	  6999.	  Firms	  not	  classified	  
using	  these	  SIC	  codes	  fall	  into	  other	  industries.	  
	   Starting	   from	   the	   M&A	   sample	   introduced	   in	   Table	   4,	   we	   are	   able	   to	   collect	   the	  
necessary	   information	   for	   a	   sub-­‐sample	  of	  805	  deals.	   Table	  14	  displays	   summary	   statistics.	   In	  
comparison	  with	  descriptive	  statistics	  displayed	  in	  Table	  5,	  	  only	  the	  mean	  value	  of	  Bidder	  Size	  	  
and	  of	  Relative	  Size	  undergo	  a	   significant	   change	   (an	   increase	  by	  around	  50%),	   that	   indicates	  
that	   our	   determinants	   of	   interest	   are	   only	   available	   for	   larger	   bidders	   and	   transactions.	   The	  
mean	   value	   of	   our	  measure	   of	   overbidding,	  Deal	   FOC,	   is	   negative	   (-­‐0.042)	   and	   is	   significantly	  
different	  from	  zero	  (with	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.00,	  unreported).	  
	   Table	  15	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  our	  multivariate	  analyses.	  Column	  (1)	  reports	  results	  when	  
limiting	   ourselves	   to	   industry	   dummies.	   In	   Column	   (2),	   we	   add	   	   bidder,	   transaction	   and	  
governance	  variables,	  	  and	  in	  Column	  (3),	  we	  replace	  industry	  dummies	  by	  industry	  fixed-­‐effects	  
and	  add	  year	  fixed-­‐effects.	  Column	  (1)	  results	  highlights	  that	  overbidding	  is	  be	  more	  significant	  
in	   high	   technology	   industries	   (p-­‐value	   of	   0.08).	   In	   Column	   (2),	   four	   variables	   are	   significantly	  
associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  overbidding:	  Bidder	  Past	  Performance	  (p-­‐value	  of	  0.02),	  the	  GIM	  
index	  (p-­‐value	  of	  0.03),	  the	  Relative	  Size	  (p-­‐value	  of	  0.01)	  and	  the	  Horizontal	  dummy	  variable	  (p-­‐
value	   of	   0.07).	   These	   results	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   existing	   literature:	   Rau	   and	   Vermaelen	  
(1998)	   show	   that	   good	   past	   performers	   (glamour	   firms)	   underperform	   in	   the	   long	   run	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Tests	  of	  bidder	  CAR	  difference	  of	  means	  by	  quartile	  of	  overbidding	  determinants	  –	  unreported	  –	   confirm	   that	  
good	  past	  performers,	  less	  leveraged	  bidders	  and	  younger	  CEOs	  display	  statistically	  significant	  lower	  CAR.	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Gompers	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  report	  that	  more	  entrenched	  CEOs	  underperform	  also.	  	  More	  overbidding	  
in	  horizontal	  is	  consistent	  with	  more	  intense	  competition	  by	  strategic	  buyers	  (see	  Akdogu,	  2011)	  
and	  Moeller	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  show	  that	  larger	  transactions	  (that	  is,	  higher	  relative	  size)	  lead	  to	  more	  
value	  destruction	  Bidder	  Leverage	  decreases	  overbidding	   (p-­‐value	  of	  0.01),	  a	   result	   consistent	  
with	   leverage	   being	   an	   external	   control	   mechanism	   to	   resolve	   agency	   conflicts	   (Jensen	   and	  
Meckling,	  1976),	  as	  does	  Toehold	   	   (p-­‐value	  of	  0.00).	  This	   is	  consistent	  with	  results	  reported	   in	  
Table	   6	   concerning	   the	   probability	   of	   success,	   which	   appears	   to	   be	   decreasing	   in	   case	   of	  
toeholds	  (less	  aggressive	  bidding	  leads	  to	  a	   lower	  probability	  of	  success).	  Overbidding	  appears	  
to	  be	  decreasing	  in	  the	  case	  of	  hostile	  transactions	  but	  this	  result	  rests	  on	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  
of	  observation	   (1.24%	  of	  our	   sample,	   see	  Table	  14).	  Overbidding	   is	   also	  decreasing	   in	   case	  of	  
negotiation,	  as	  expected.	  These	  results	  are	  all	  confirmed	  in	  Column	  (3).	  
	  
3.2.	  Overbidding	  and	  Irrationality	  
We	  next	  attempt	  to	  test	  whether	  overbidding	  is	  related	  to	  irrationality	  or	  some	  form	  of	  
cognitive	  bias.	  The	  existence	  of	  CEO	  overconfidence	  and	  narcissism	  has	  been	  well	  documented	  
in	  the	  literature	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Hambrick,	  2007	  and	  2011;	  Malmendier	  and	  Tate,	  2008;	  Aktas	  et	  
al.,	  2016).	  Raskin	  and	  Shaw	  (1988)	  show	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  first	  person	  singular	  pronouns	  to	  
first	   person	   plural	   pronouns	   (the	   I/we	   ratio)	   used	   in	   speech	   is	   correlated	   with	   narcissistic	  
personality	   inventory	   scores,	   a	   questionnaire	   that	   provides	   a	   narcissism	   score	   for	   individuals.	  
This	  result	  motivates	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  to	  use	  the	  I/we	  ratio	  as	  measure	  of	  CEO	  narcissism.	  The	  
I/we	  ratio	  is	  estimated	  using	  the	  proportion	  of	  first	  person	  singular	  (I,	  me,	  my,	  mine,	  myself)	  to	  
total	  first	  person	  pronouns	  (I,	  me,	  my,	  mine,	  myself,	  we,	  us,	  our	  ours,	  ourselves)	  in	  CEO	  speech,	  
following	   Chatterjee	   and	  Hambrick	   (2007).	   CEO	   speeches	   are	  mainly	   transcripts	   of	   interviews	  
with	  financial	  analysts	  or	  journalists,	  recorded	  in	  the	  Lexis	  Nexis	  Academic	  and	  The	  Wall	  Street	  
Transcript	   databases,	   and	   are	   filtered	   manually	   to	   avoid	   contamination	   (e.g.:	   transcripts	   of	  
annual	  general	  meetings,	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  scripting).	  We	  use	  the	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  data	  set,	  
extended	  in	  de	  Bodt	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  to	  collect	  CEOs	  I/we	  ratio	  for	  the	  805	  transactions	  for	  which	  
overbidding	  determinants	  are	  available.	  Despite	  manual	  matching,	  we	  are	  only	  able	   to	  obtain	  
the	  CEO	  I/we	  ratio	  for	  a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  174	  transactions.	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Table	  16	  replicates	  Table	  15	  results	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  CEO	  narcissism	  as	  independent	  
variable	  for	  this	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  174	  transactions.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  the	  CEO	  narcissism	  variable	  is	  
negative	  in	  all	  specifications,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  narcissistic	  CEO	  bidding	  more	  aggressively,	  
but	  coefficients	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  customary	  levels.	  Whether	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  
of	  power	  due	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  or	  revealing	  the	  absence	  of	  effect	  of	  this	  CEO	  personality	  
trait	   remains,	   at	   this	   stage,	   an	   open	   issue.	   The	   loss	   of	   significance	   of	  most	   control	   variables	  
provides	  some	  indication	  that	  lack	  of	  power	  may	  play	  a	  role.	  
As	   a	   second	   attempt	   to	   explore	   the	   role	   of	   irrationality	   in	   observed	   overbidding	  
behavior,	  we	  	  adopt	  an	  alternative	  indirect	  empirical	  strategy.	  If	  overbidding	  is	  related	  to	  failing	  
to	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  winner’s	  curse,	  bidders	  losing	  the	  competition	  to	  acquire	  targets	  should	  
display	  less	  (or	  no)	  overbidding.	  Losing	  bidders	  may	  indeed	  be	  bidding	  less	  aggressively	  because	  
they	   are	   more	   fully	   aware	   of	   the	   winner’s	   curse.	   Under	   the	   winner’s	   curse	   explanation	   of	  
irrational	  bidding	  suggested	  in	  Roll	  (1986),	  we	  should	  therefore	  observe	  weaker	  (or	  absence	  of)	  
rejection	  of	  the	  FOC	  of	  rational	  bidding	  for	  losing	  bidders.	  	  
Out	  of	  the	  5,780	  transactions	  included	  in	  Table	  1	  sample,	  1,152	  are	  failed.	  We	  are	  able	  to	  
collect	   the	   information	  needed	  to	   test	   the	  FOC	  of	   rational	  bidding	   for	  545	  transactions	  out	  of	  
the	  them	  (excluding	  SEC	  filings	  based	  variables	  because	  SEC	  filings	  are	  most	  often	  unavailable	  
for	   failed	   transactions).	   Table	   17	   displays	   descriptive	   statistics	   comparable	   to	   Table	   5	   for	   this	  
sub-­‐sample	   of	   failed	   transactions.	   	   Notably,	   failed	   transactions	   are	   undertaken	   by	   far	   smaller	  
bidders	   (USD	   6.4	   billion	   against	   USD	   18.5	   billion	   in	   Table	   5),	   and	   consequently	   display	   a	   far	  
higher	   relative	   size	   (64.15%	  versus	  27.45%	   in	  Table	  5).	   	   They	  also	  display	   lower	   target	   run-­‐up	  
(3.63%	  versus	  9.58%	  in	  Table	  5),	  lower	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premium	  (35.05%	  versus	  42.27%	  in	  Table	  5),	  
far	  higher	  toehold	  (10.46%	  versus	  2.07%	  in	  Table	  5),	  far	  more	  frequent	  hostility	  (10.46%	  versus	  
0.88%	  in	  Table	  5)	  and	  multiple	  bidder	  competition	  (26.24%	  versus	  2,27%	  in	  Table	  5).	  Table	  18	  
replicates	  Table	  6	  FOC	  tests	  of	  rational	  bidding.	  The	  FOC	  of	  rational	  bidding	  is	  not	  rejected.	  This	  
is	   true	  whether	   using	   the	   8-­‐week	  bid	   premium	  or	   its	  winsorized	   version	   and	  using	   the	  Wang	  
(2015)	  or	  the	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  costs	  of	  failure	  estimates.	  These	  results	  are	  striking	  because	  of	  
the	  very	  high	  level	  of	  rejection	  displayed	  in	  Table	  6.	  A	  closer	  analysis	  of	  the	  results	  reveals	  that	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the	  FOC	  is	  not	  rejected	  essentially	  because	  the	  bid	  premium	  is	  not	  inversely	  associated	  with	  the	  
bidder	  (scaled)	  CAR.	  	  
	   We	   conclude	   that	   conflicts	   between	   shareholders	   and	   CEOs	   play	   a	   role	   in	   explaining	  
overbidding	  behavior	  and	  that	  some	  indirect	  evidence	  exists	  that	  failing	  to	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  
winner’s	  curse	  may	  be	  also	  at	  work.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   Behavioral	  corporate	  finance	  has	  evolved	  markedly	  during	  the	   last	  decades.	  The	  hubris	  
hypothesis	   suggests	   how	   irrational	   behavior	   may	   lead	   to	   overbidding:	   if	   bidders	   don’t	  
sufficiently	   bias	   bids	   downward	   to	   account	   for	   the	   winner’s	   curse,	   they	   overvalue	   targets.	  
Agency	  conflicts	  are	  a	  second	  potential	  source	  of	  overbidding.	  
	   Only	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   studies	   report	   results	   pertaining	   to	   overbidding	   in	   M&A.	  
Results	  are	  moreover	  in	  conflict,	  some	  authors	  failing	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  overbidding	  (Moeller	  
et	   al.,	   2004;	   Boone	   and	  Mulherin,	   2008),	   others	   failing	   to	   reject	   the	   absence	   of	   overbidding	  
(Berkovitch	  and	  Narayanan,	  1993)	  or	  even	  reporting	  results	  supporting	  overbidding	  (Hietala	  et	  
al.,	  2003;	  Mueller	  and	  Sirower,	  2003;	  Eckbo	  and	  Thorburn,	  2009).	  	  
	   In	   this	  paper,	  we	   introduce	  a	  new	  direct	   test	  of	  overbidding	   in	  M&A	  transactions.	  The	  
test	  rests	  on	  the	  first	  order	  condition	  of	  an	  acquirer’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization.	   It	  models	  
the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	   probability	   of	   success	   and	   the	   acquirer	   profit,	   conditionally	   on	   a	  
successful	   acquisition,	   when	   choosing	   the	   bid	   premium.	   Our	   results	   strongly	   support	   the	  
presence	   of	   overbidding.	   We	   highlight	   the	   role	   of	   bidder	   past	   performance,	   bidder	   CEO	  
entrenchment,	   target	   to	   bidder	   relative	   size	   and	   horizontal	   transactions	   as	   overbidding	  
exacerbating	   factors,	   while	   bidder	   leverage,	   toeholds	   and	   negotiation	   between	   the	   parties	  
attenuate	  such	  behavior.	  Using	  a	  sample	  of	  failed	  transactions,	  we	  also	  report	  indirect	  evidence	  
that	  failing	  to	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  winner’s	  curse	  may	  be	  at	  work.	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Figure	  1	  –	  First	  Order	  Condition	  Test	  of	  Overbidding	  Histogram	  
Figure	  1	  displays	  the	  histogram	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  	  first	  order	  condition	  test	  (Equation	  
(5))	  obtained	  using	  estimation	  of	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  by	  seemingly	  unrelated	  regression	  and	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  and	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2008)	  costs	  of	  failure	  estimate	  case	  ..	  	  The	  M&A	  sample	  is	  described	  in	  















Figure	  2	  –	  First	  Order	  Condition	  Test	  of	  Overbidding	  using	  Non-­‐Linear	  SUR	  Specification	  
Figure	  2	  displays	  results	  obtained	  using	  an	  order	  three	  polynomial	  SUR	  specification	  (Equations	  (8)	  and	  (9)).	  Panel	  A	  
graphs	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization	  FOC	  (Equation	  (10))	  Chi2	  statistic	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  winsorized	  
8-­‐week	  bid	  premium,	  using	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  estimate	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  failure.	  	  Panel	  B	  highlights	  the	  behavior	  of	  
the	  expected	  profit	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  partial	  derivatives,	  again	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  winsorized	  8-­‐week	  
bid	  premium.	  	  The	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premium	  is	  winsorized	  at	  the	  one	  and	  ninety-­‐nine	  percentiles.	  The	  horizontal	  axis	  is	  
the	   winsorized	   8-­‐week	   bid	   premium	   percentiles	   in	   both	   panels.	   In	   Panel	   A,	   the	   vertical	   axis	   reports	   the	   Chi2	  
statistic.	  In	  Panel	  B,	  the	  left	  vertical	  axis	  provides	  values	  of	  the	  expected	  profit	  partial	  derivatives	  and	  the	  right	  one,	  
the	  probability	  of	  success	  partial	  derivative.	  
	  
Panel	  A	  –	  Chi2	  Statistic	  as	  a	  Function	  of	  the	  Winsorized	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  
	  
	  
	  Panel	  B	  –	  Expected	  Profit	  and	  Probability	  of	  Success	  Partial	  Derivatives	  as	  a	  Function	  of	  the	  Winsorized	  8-­‐week	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Figure	  3	  –	  Overbidding	  and	  Risk	  Aversion	  
Figure	   3	   represents	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   CEO	   maximization	   program	   first	   order	   condition	   (obtained	   solving	  
Equation	   (11))	   as	   a	   function	  of	   the	  CEO	   risk	   aversion	   coefficient.	   	   As	   explained	   in	   Section	  2.4,	  we	  use	   the	  CARA	  
utility	  function	  to	  model	  risk	  aversion.	  The	  horizontal	  axis	  reports	  the	  risk	  aversion	  coefficient	  value	  (from	  1	  to	  10,	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Table	  1	  –	  Probit	  Sample	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
Table	  1	  presents	  the	  M&A	  sample	  used	  to	  estimate	  Equation	  (6).	  The	  sample	  includes	  all	  transactions	  between	  US	  
bidders	  and	  US	  listed	  targets,	  with	  a	  deal	  size	  above	  USD	  1	  million,	  for	  which	  the	  bidder	  held	  less	  than	  50%	  before	  
the	  acquisition	  attempt	  and	  more	  than	  50%	  after,	  reported	  in	  the	  SDC	  database	  between	  1994	  and	  2014.	  #Deals	  is	  
the	  number	  of	  deals,	  Success	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  completed	  transaction	  by	  year,	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  the	  offer	  
price	  divided	  by	  the	  share	  price	  of	  the	  target	  42	  days	  before	  the	  announcement	  date.	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  
Year	   #Deals	   Success	   Mean	   Median	  
1994	   202	   78.00%	   34.03%	   33.48%	  
1995	   345	   77.00%	   42.90%	   37.65%	  
1996	   362	   80.00%	   38.48%	   32.31%	  
1997	   496	   82.00%	   37.22%	   34.69%	  
1998	   493	   82.00%	   40.30%	   33.33%	  
1999	   532	   78.00%	   50.21%	   43.40%	  
2000	   433	   76.00%	   46.81%	   40.80%	  
2001	   310	   85.00%	   44.86%	   40.67%	  
2002	   184	   77.00%	   43.98%	   37.18%	  
2003	   234	   82.00%	   42.95%	   31.89%	  
2004	   212	   86.00%	   31.90%	   26.87%	  
2005	   244	   81.00%	   28.47%	   25.37%	  
2006	   292	   80.00%	   28.65%	   24.65%	  
2007	   301	   78.00%	   28.81%	   26.28%	  
2008	   187	   66.00%	   26.94%	   23.57%	  
2009	   119	   80.00%	   54.38%	   46.23%	  
2010	   196	   85.00%	   45.41%	   39.44%	  
2011	   172	   80.00%	   40.37%	   34.43%	  
2012	   160	   84.00%	   42.30%	   34.21%	  
2013	   156	   83.00%	   38.45%	   34.63%	  
2014	   150	   85.00%	   32.93%	   27.55%	  
Total	   5780	   80.07%	   39.58%	   33.43%	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Table	  2	  –	  Probit	  Variables	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  and	  Test	  of	  Difference	  of	  Means	  
Table	  2	  reports	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  variables	   included	  in	  Equation	  (6),	  the	  probit	  model	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  
probability	   of	   acquisition	   attempt	   success	   (see	   Section	   1.3),	   as	   well	   as	   a	   standard	   test	   of	   difference	   of	   means	  
between	   completed	   and	   uncompleted	   transactions.	   The	   M&A	   sample	   is	   described	   in	   Section	   1.3	   and	   Table	   1.	  
Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  Mean	  is	  for	  arithmetic	  average,	  Median	  for	  sample	  median,	  Stdev	  for	  standard	  
deviation,	  #Deals	  for	  the	  number	  of	  deals,	  t-­‐stat	  for	  the	  Student	  statistic	  of	  the	  difference	  of	  means	  test	  and	  p-­‐val,	  
the	  corresponding	  probability	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  difference.	  
	  
	  	   All	  deals	   Uncompleted	   Completed	   	  	   	  	  
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   Stdev	   #Deals	   Mean	   Mean	   t-­‐stat	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  success	   80.07%	   100.00%	   39.95%	   5,780	   n.a	   n.a	   n.a	   n.a	  
Target	  Size	   1,137,571	   161,655	   4,169,262	   5,780	   1,270,613	   1,104,454	   1.21	   0.23	  
Nyse	  Amex	   6.18%	   0.00%	   24.07%	   5,780	   6.77%	   6.03%	   0.94	   0.35	  
Turnover	   6.0781	   3.8701	   6.5333	   5,780	   6.0957	   6.0738	   0.10	   0.92	  
Poison	  Pill	   1.21%	   0.00%	   10.94%	   5,780	   4.08%	   0.50%	   10.03	   0.00	  
52Weeks	  High	   65.94%	   68.51%	   18.17%	   5,780	   65.51%	   66.04%	   -­‐0.90	   0.37	  
Toehold	   7.99%	   0.00%	   27.12%	   5,780	   19.27%	   5.19%	   16.12	   0.00	  
Listed	  Bidder	   67.58%	   100.00%	   46.81%	   5,780	   52.43%	   71.35%	   -­‐12.44	   0.00	  
Horizontal	   32.80%	   0.00%	   46.95%	   5,780	   27.78%	   34.05%	   -­‐4.06	   0.00	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   39.58%	   33.43%	   39.22%	   5,780	   33.87%	   41.00%	   -­‐5.53	   0.00	  
Tender	  Offer	   16.73%	   0.00%	   37.33%	   5,780	   9.11%	   18.63%	   -­‐7.78	   0.00	  
All	  Cash	   43.56%	   0.00%	   49.59%	   5,780	   53.82%	   41.01%	   7.89	   0.00	  
All	  Stock	   27.06%	   0.00%	   44.43%	   5,780	   17.80%	   29.36%	   -­‐7.95	   0.00	  
Hostile	  	   2.92%	   0.00%	   16.85%	   5,780	   11.11%	   0.89%	   19.00	   0.00	  
Year	  1990's	   42.04%	   0.00%	   49.37%	   5,780	   42.53%	   41.92%	   0.38	   0.70	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Table	  3	  –	  Probability	  of	  Deal	  Completion	  Estimation	  Results	  
Table	  3	  displays	  Equation	   (6)	  estimation	   results,	   the	  probit	  model	  used	   to	  estimate	   the	  probability	  of	  acquisition	  
attempt	  success	  (see	  Section	  1.3).	  The	  M&A	  sample	  is	  describe	  in	  Section	  1.3	  and	  Table	  1.	  Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  
Appendix	  B.	  Two	  specifications	  are	  reported:	  in	  column	  (1),	  the	  raw	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  used;	  in	  column	  (2),	  the	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  is	  winsorized	  at	  the	  one	  and	  ninety-­‐nine	  percentiles.	  Coeff	  stands	  for	  coefficient	  and	  p-­‐val	  for	  
p-­‐value.	  
	  
	  	   (1)	   (2)	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Target	  Size	   0.0458	   (0.00)	   0.0460	   (0.00)	  
Nyse	  Amex	   0.0382	   (0.64)	   0.0344	   (0.67)	  
Turnover	   -­‐0.0058	   (0.09)	   -­‐0.0049	   (0.15)	  
Poison	  Pill	   -­‐0.9149	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.9215	   (0.00)	  
52Weeks	  High	   0.4115	   (0.00)	   0.5080	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   -­‐0.6116	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.6064	   (0.00)	  
Listed	  Bidder	   0.3052	   (0.00)	   0.3008	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   0.0145	   (0.75)	   0.0164	   (0.71)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   0.2378	   (0.00)	   0.3693	   (0.00)	  
Tender	  Offer	   0.8726	   (0.00)	   0.8629	   (0.00)	  
All	  Cash	   -­‐0.1488	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.1501	   (0.01)	  
All	  Stock	   0.2289	   (0.00)	   0.2334	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐1.6962	   (0.00)	   -­‐1.7102	   (0.00)	  
Year	  1990's	   -­‐0.1019	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.1022	   (0.02)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.1558	   (0.42)	   -­‐0.2709	   (0.15)	  
N	   5780	   	  	   5780	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Table	  4	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  M&A	  Sample	  	  
Table	  4	  describes	  the	  M&A	  sample	  used	  to	  estimate	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  with	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  regression	  
(SUR)	  estimator	  and	  to	  test	  Equation	  (5),	  the	  first-­‐order	  condition	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization.	  The	  
sample	   composition	   procedure	   is	   described	   in	   Section	   1.4.	   We	   obtain	   a	   list	   of	   1,935	   completed	   transactions,	  
between	  US	   listed	   bidders	   and	  US	   listed	   targets,	  with	   a	   deal	   size	   of	   at	   least	  USD	   100	  million.	   These	   are	   control	  
transactions	   (for	   completed	   transactions,	   the	   bidder	   must	   hold	   less	   than	   50%	   of	   the	   target	   shares	   before	   the	  
transaction	  and	  more	  than	  50%	  afterwards),	  necessary	  information	  to	  compute	  the	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  must	  be	  
available	   and	   SEC	   filings	  must	   contain	   necessary	   information	   to	   identify	   the	  deal	   initiator	   and	   the	   sales	   process.	  
#Deals	   is	   the	  number	  of	  deals,	  Deal	  Value	   is	   reported	   in	  USD	  million,	  Bidder	  CAR,	  Target	  CAR	   and	  Deal	  CAR	   are	  
obtained	  using	  the	  market	  model	  as	  return	  generating	  process,	  day	  minus	  250	  to	  day	  minus	  10	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
announcement	  date	  estimation	  window,	  the	  CRSP	  value	  weighted	  index	  as	  proxy	  for	  the	  market	  index	  and	  a	  three	  
days	  event	  window	  centered	  around	  the	  announcement.	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  and	  Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	  are	  the	  bidder	  and	  
deal	   CAR	   divided	   by	   the	   estimated	   ex-­‐ante	   probability	   of	   deal	   completion	   (Probability	   of	   Success).	   8-­‐week	   Bid	  
Premium	   is	   the	   offer	   price	   divided	   by	   the	   share	   price	   of	   the	   target	   42	   days	   before	   the	   announcement	   date.	  
Probability	   of	   Success	   is	   the	   average	   estimated	   ex-­‐ante	   probability	   of	   deal	   completion	   (we	   follow	   Bhagat	   et	   al.	  
(2005)	  probability	  scaling	  method).	  
	  




























1994	   32	   1,050	   330	   -­‐0.07%	   -­‐0.10%	   26.65%	   2.96%	   4.02%	   45.66%	   85.15%	  
1995	   92	   1273	   315	   -­‐1.42%	   -­‐1.64%	   21.04%	   1.78%	   2.76%	   43.93%	   84.92%	  
1996	   110	   1,573	   419	   0.09%	   0.07%	   19.63%	   3.18%	   4.04%	   41.57%	   85.75%	  
1997	   189	   1,091	   412	   -­‐0.82%	   -­‐0.99%	   15.95%	   1.66%	   1.79%	   42.69%	   88.16%	  
1998	   188	   3,112	   516	   -­‐2.30%	   -­‐2.62%	   17.86%	   0.95%	   1.12%	   42.58%	   87.05%	  
1999	   203	   1,906	   493	   -­‐1.40%	   -­‐1.61%	   23.32%	   1.28%	   1.51%	   53.54%	   86.87%	  
2000	   140	   3,234	   729	   -­‐5.40%	   -­‐6.54%	   23.85%	   -­‐1.33%	   -­‐0.50%	   50.68%	   89.17%	  
2001	   88	   1,966	   413	   -­‐3.30%	   -­‐3.99%	   24.63%	   -­‐0.38%	   -­‐0.64%	   49.68%	   87.70%	  
2002	   55	   1,884	   384	   -­‐2.87%	   -­‐3.48%	   18.93%	   -­‐0.49%	   -­‐0.75%	   33.55%	   87.21%	  
2003	   80	   1,778	   435	   -­‐1.63%	   -­‐2.10%	   22.42%	   0.42%	   0.32%	   43.42%	   86.72%	  
2004	   98	   2,423	   522	   -­‐1.77%	   -­‐1.92%	   18.35%	   1.70%	   2.07%	   32.50%	   86.88%	  
2005	   86	   3,581	   892	   -­‐1.26%	   -­‐1.49%	   20.14%	   1.32%	   1.54%	   33.28%	   85.53%	  
2006	   99	   3,441	   884	   -­‐1.12%	   -­‐1.18%	   18.94%	   1.74%	   2.13%	   29.27%	   85.66%	  
2007	   97	   1,573	   810	   -­‐0.57%	   -­‐0.64%	   24.92%	   2.53%	   2.92%	   32.26%	   87.35%	  
2008	   52	   3,107	   698	   -­‐2.92%	   -­‐3.37%	   29.59%	   1.68%	   1.85%	   27.81%	   88.67%	  
2009	   48	   4,602	   1,049	   -­‐0.46%	   -­‐0.67%	   30.51%	   2.87%	   3.16%	   58.74%	   88.67%	  
2010	   59	   1,701	   673	   0.34%	   0.43%	   31.72%	   3.37%	   3.89%	   44.06%	   87.57%	  
2011	   38	   3,860	   900	   -­‐1.02%	   -­‐1.13%	   27.18%	   4.14%	   4.69%	   44.14%	   88.26%	  
2012	   52	   1,636	   878	   0.93%	   1.14%	   31.69%	   4.95%	   5.77%	   42.29%	   87.82%	  
2013	   58	   1,695	   697	   3.16%	   3.70%	   28.10%	   6.53%	   7.53%	   41.10%	   87.48%	  
2014	   71	   4,333	   1,106	   0.93%	   1.03%	   29.33%	   5.06%	   5.78%	   39.17%	   88.98%	  
total	   1935	   2,342	   571	   -­‐1.38%	   -­‐1.63%	   22.47%	   1.77%	   2.16%	   42.27%	   87.20%	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Table	  5	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  	  
Table	  5	  reports	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  variables	  used	  to	  estimate	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  with	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  
regression	   (SUR)	   estimator	   and	   to	   test	   Equation	   (5),	   the	   first-­‐order	   condition	   of	   the	   bidder’s	   expected	   profit	  
maximization.	  	  The	  M&A	  sample	  is	  described	  in	  Section	  1.4	  and	  Table	  4.	  Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  Mean	  
is	   the	   arithmetic	   average,	  Median	   the	   corresponding	  median,	   Stdev,	   the	   standard	   deviation	   of	   the	  mean.	   p-­‐val	  
reports	  the	  p-­‐value	  of	  the	  standard	  test	  of	  sample	  mean	  statistical	  significance.	  
	  
	  	   All	  deals	  -­‐	  1935	  deals	  
Variable	   Mean	   p-­‐val	   Median	   Stdev	  
Bidder	  CAR	   -­‐1.38%	   (0.00)	   -­‐1.11%	   8.22%	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   -­‐1.63%	   (0.00)	   -­‐1.28%	   9.62%	  
Target	  CAR	   22.47%	   (0.00)	   18.50%	   23.42%	  
Deal	  CAR	   1.77%	   (0.00)	   1.34%	   7.86%	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   2.16%	   (0.00)	   1.54%	   10.01%	  
Target	  Runup	   9.58%	   (0.00)	   6.98%	   21.84%	  
Probability	  of	  Success	   87.20%	  
	  
87.58%	   7.57%	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   42.27%	  
	  
35.87%	   35.47%	  
Bidder	  Size	   18,500,000	  
	  
3,703,431	   43,300,000	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   0.0642	  
	  
0.0382	   0.0894	  
Relative	  Size	   27.45%	  
	  
13.67%	   40.32%	  
Horizontal	   40.57%	  
	  
0.00%	   49.12%	  
All	  Stock	   37.36%	  
	  
0.00%	   48.39%	  
Toehold	   2.07%	  
	  
0.00%	   14.23%	  
Hostile	   0.88%	  
	  
0.00%	   9.33%	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0895	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0028	   0.5275	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   -­‐0.0914	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.1933	   0.4919	  
Initiation	   42.02%	  
	  
0.00%	   49.37%	  
Negotiation	   39.90%	  
	  
0.00%	   48.98%	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   2.27%	   	  	   0.00%	   14.91%	  
	  
	  
	   	  
44	  
	  
Table	  6	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  SUR	  Results	  	  
Table	  6	  summarizes	  estimation	  results	  of	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  and	  the	  ensuing	  test	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  
maximization	   FOC	   (Equation	   (5)).	   Estimations	   are	   obtained	   using	   the	   seemingly	   unrelated	   regression	   (SUR)	  
estimator.	  p-­‐values	  are	  reported	  between	  parentheses.	  	  The	  M&A	  sample	  is	  described	  in	  Section	  1.4	  and	  Table	  4.	  
Variables	   are	   defined	   in	   Appendix	   B.	   Coeff	   stands	   for	   coefficient	   and	   p-­‐val	   for	   p-­‐value.	   Chi2	   is	   the	   chi-­‐squared	  
statistic	  of	   the	  cross-­‐equation	  restriction	  defined	  at	  Equation	   (5)	  and	  FOC	  Test,	   the	  corresponding	  point	  estimate	  
(FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	  uses	  Wang	  (2015)	  costs	  of	  failure	  estimate	  and	  FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu),	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  one).	  
Columns	   (1)	   and	   (2)	   present	   results	   for	   the	   raw	   8-­‐week	   bid	   premium,	   while	   Columns	   (3)	   and	   (4)	   report	  
corresponding	   results	   using	   the	   winsorized	   8-­‐week	   bid	   premium	   (winsorization	   is	   at	   one	   and	   ninety-­‐nine	  
percentiles).	  In	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (3),	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  (we	  follow	  Bhagat	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  
probability	  scaling	  method)	  and	  in	  Columns	  (2)	  and	  (4),	  it	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  deal	  completion.	  	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.7968	   (0.00)	   0.0045	   (0.72)	   0.7898	   (0.00)	   0.0055	   (0.67)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1021	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0053	   (0.44)	   0.1027	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0024	   (0.73)	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   -­‐0.0541	   (0.00)	   0.0351	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0596	   (0.00)	   0.0543	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0052	   (0.00)	   0.0038	   (0.00)	   0.0050	   (0.00)	   0.0040	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  
Liquidity	   -­‐0.0144	   (0.34)	   -­‐0.0020	   (0.88)	   -­‐0.0141	   (0.35)	   -­‐0.0061	   (0.65)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0319	   (0.00)	   0.0119	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0327	   (0.00)	   0.0131	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0029	   (0.29)	   0.0049	   (0.04)	   -­‐0.0030	   (0.28)	   0.0053	   (0.03)	  
All	  Stock	   -­‐0.0009	   (0.75)	   0.0223	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0011	   (0.70)	   0.0228	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0166	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.1207	   (0.00)	   0.0172	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.1183	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.2102	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5035	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.2096	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5059	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0012	   (0.66)	   0.0023	   (0.31)	   0.0012	   (0.65)	   0.0021	   (0.37)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0039	   (0.17)	   0.0068	   (0.01)	   0.0039	   (0.18)	   0.0061	   (0.02)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0035	   (0.24)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.13)	   -­‐0.0031	   (0.30)	   -­‐0.0043	   (0.10)	  
Negotiation	   0.0054	   (0.07)	   -­‐0.0066	   (0.01)	   0.0053	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.0068	   (0.01)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0039	   (0.67)	   0.0113	   (0.15)	   -­‐0.0027	   (0.76)	   0.0105	   (0.19)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0864	   (0.00)	   0.7983	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0818	   (0.00)	   0.7873	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0455	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0495	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   132.44	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   124.72	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0419	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0438	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   107.21	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   93.77	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
	  
	  




Table	   7	   –	   Bidder’s	   Expected	   Profit	  Maximization	   Test	   –	   Non-­‐linear	   Seemingly	   Unrelated	   Regression	  
Test	  
Table	  7	  reproduces	  results	  displayed	  in	  Table	  6	  using	  an	  order	  three	  polynomial	  seemingly	  unrelated	  specification	  
(see	  Equations	  (8)	  and	  (9)).	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium,	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium2	  and	  8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium3	  are	  respectively	  
the	  winsorized	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premium,	  its	  square	  and	  its	  cube.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	   	  	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  CAR	   0.7936	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0026	   (0.84)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1073	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0106	   (0.13)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   -­‐0.1007	   (0.00)	   0.1456	   (0.00)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium2	   0.0469	   (0.05)	   -­‐0.1402	   (0.00)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium3	   -­‐0.0122	   (0.23)	   0.0516	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0049	   (0.00)	   0.0041	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   -­‐0.0181	   (0.24)	   0.0029	   (0.82)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0339	   (0.00)	   0.0143	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0036	   (0.20)	   0.0062	   (0.01)	  
All	  Stock	   -­‐0.0020	   (0.49)	   0.0253	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0152	   (0.12)	   -­‐0.1141	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.2076	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5077	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0013	   (0.63)	   0.0022	   (0.33)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0037	   (0.20)	   0.0066	   (0.01)	  
Initiation	   0.0044	   (0.14)	   -­‐0.0058	   (0.03)	  
Negotiation	   -­‐0.0031	   (0.30)	   -­‐0.0043	   (0.10)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0025	   (0.78)	   0.0105	   (0.18)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0726	   (0.00)	   0.7726	   (0.00)	  
N	   1935	   	  	   1935	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0580	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   100.62	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0559	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   91.90	   (0.00)	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Table	  8	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Unscaled	  Bidder	  CAR	  	  
Table	  8	  reproduces	  results	  displayed	  in	  Table	  6	  using	  the	  Bidder	  CAR	  and	  Deal	  CAR	  in	  place	  of	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
and	  Deal	  Scaled	  CAR.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	   Bidder	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  CAR	   0.9802	   (0.00)	   0.0502	   (0.00)	   0.9842	   (0.00)	   0.0515	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.0914	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0037	   (0.60)	   0.0931	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0006	   (0.93)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   -­‐0.0526	   (0.00)	   0.0337	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0599	   (0.00)	   0.0525	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0057	   (0.00)	   0.0040	   (0.00)	   0.0056	   (0.00)	   0.0043	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   -­‐0.0021	   (0.81)	   -­‐0.0005	   (0.97)	   -­‐0.0010	   (0.91)	   -­‐0.0046	   (0.73)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0304	   (0.00)	   0.0105	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0316	   (0.00)	   0.0116	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0037	   (0.02)	   0.0048	   (0.04)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.01)	   0.0052	   (0.03)	  
All	  Stock	   0.0023	   (0.18)	   0.0235	   (0.00)	   0.0024	   (0.16)	   0.0241	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0087	   (0.13)	   -­‐0.1209	   (0.00)	   0.0085	   (0.13)	   -­‐0.1185	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.0196	   (0.03)	   -­‐0.5040	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0184	   (0.03)	   -­‐0.5062	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   -­‐0.0012	   (0.45)	   0.0019	   (0.40)	   -­‐0.0013	   (0.42)	   0.0017	   (0.46)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0014	   (0.41)	   0.0068	   (0.01)	   0.0013	   (0.43)	   0.0061	   (0.02)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0043	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.12)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.0043	   (0.10)	  
Negotiation	   0.0059	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0063	   (0.02)	   0.0058	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0065	   (0.01)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0063	   (0.24)	   0.0116	   (0.14)	   -­‐0.0051	   (0.34)	   0.0109	   (0.17)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0947	   (0.00)	   0.7935	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0913	   (0.00)	   0.7827	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0442	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0497	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   356.15	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   373.02	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0407	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0442	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   288.37	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   282.53	   (0.00)	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Table	  9	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Asymmetric	  SUR	  Specification	  
Table	   9	   reproduces	   results	   displayed	   in	   Table	   6	   keeping	   only	   statistically	   significant	   variables	   in	   the	   seemingly	  
unrelated	  regression	  (SUR)	  specification.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	   	  	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.7983	   (0.00)	  
	    
0.7913	   (0.00)	  
	    Target	  Runup	   0.1022	   (0.00)	  
	    
0.1025	   (0.00)	  
	    8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   -­‐0.0546	   (0.00)	   0.0331	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0600	   (0.00)	   0.0533	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0051	   (0.00)	   0.0038	   (0.00)	   0.0050	   (0.00)	   0.0040	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	  
	          Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0335	   (0.00)	   0.0118	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0342	   (0.00)	   0.0133	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	  
	    
0.0051	   (0.03)	  
	    
0.0055	   (0.02)	  
All	  Stock	  
	    
0.0211	   (0.00)	  
	    
0.0225	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0162	   (0.09)	   -­‐0.1199	   (0.00)	   0.0168	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.1170	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.2080	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5055	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.2067	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5081	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	  
	          BidderPrivateAmihud	  
	    
0.0058	   (0.02)	  
	    
0.0051	   (0.04)	  
Initiation	  
	        
-­‐0.0045	   (0.09)	  
Negotiation	   0.0069	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.0055	   (0.02)	   0.0067	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.0071	   (0.01)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	  
	          _cons	   -­‐0.0902	   (0.00)	   0.7973	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0859	   (0.00)	   0.7870	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0460	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0499	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   137.56	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   128.81	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0426	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0444	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   114.57	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   99.12	   (0.00)	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Table	  10	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Heteroskedasticity	  Robust	  Estimation	  
Table	   10	   reproduces	   results	   displayed	   in	   Table	   6	   using	   the	   Eicker-­‐Huber-­‐White-­‐sandwich	   covariance	   estimator	  
robust	  to	  heteroskedasticity.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.7968	   (0.00)	   0.0045	   (0.88)	   0.7898	   (0.00)	   0.0055	   (0.86)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1021	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0053	   (0.46)	   0.1027	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0024	   (0.74)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   -­‐0.0541	   (0.00)	   0.0351	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0596	   (0.00)	   0.0543	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0052	   (0.00)	   0.0038	   (0.00)	   0.0050	   (0.00)	   0.0040	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   -­‐0.0144	   (0.35)	   -­‐0.0020	   (0.88)	   -­‐0.0141	   (0.37)	   -­‐0.0061	   (0.66)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0319	   (0.00)	   0.0119	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0327	   (0.00)	   0.0131	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0029	   (0.23)	   0.0049	   (0.03)	   -­‐0.0030	   (0.22)	   0.0053	   (0.02)	  
All	  Stock	   -­‐0.0009	   (0.82)	   0.0223	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0011	   (0.80)	   0.0228	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0166	   (0.39)	   -­‐0.1207	   (0.00)	   0.0172	   (0.38)	   -­‐0.1183	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.2102	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.5035	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.2096	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.5059	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0012	   (0.67)	   0.0023	   (0.33)	   0.0012	   (0.66)	   0.0021	   (0.39)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0039	   (0.24)	   0.0068	   (0.01)	   0.0039	   (0.25)	   0.0061	   (0.02)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0035	   (0.25)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.13)	   -­‐0.0031	   (0.30)	   -­‐0.0043	   (0.10)	  
Negotiation	   0.0054	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.0066	   (0.01)	   0.0053	   (0.03)	   -­‐0.0068	   (0.01)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0039	   (0.69)	   0.0113	   (0.15)	   -­‐0.0027	   (0.78)	   0.0105	   (0.18)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0864	   (0.00)	   0.7983	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0818	   (0.00)	   0.7873	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0455	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0495	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   56.16	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   56.86	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0419	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0470	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   46.56	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   43.48	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
	  




Table	  11	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Truncated	  Bivariate	  ML	  	  
Table	   11	   reproduces	   results	   displayed	   in	   Table	   6	   modelling	   the	   Bidder	   Scaled	   CAR	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   deal	  
completion	   joint	  density	  as	  a	   truncated	  bivariate	  normal	  density	  and	  using	   the	  Maximimum	  Likelihood	  estimator	  
(see	   Section	   2.5	   and	   Equations	   (12)	   to	   (14)).	   Column	   (1)	   display	   results	   for	   the	   Bidder	   Scaled	   CAR	   dependent	  
variable	  and	  Column	  (2),	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  deal	  completion.	  	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  CAR	   0.7968	   (0.00)	   0.0045	   (0.72)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1021	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0053	   (0.44)	  
8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   -­‐0.0541	   (0.00)	   0.0351	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0052	   (0.00)	   0.0038	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   -­‐0.0144	   (0.34)	   -­‐0.0020	   (0.88)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0319	   (0.00)	   0.0119	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0029	   (0.29)	   0.0049	   (0.04)	  
All	  Stock	   -­‐0.0009	   (0.75)	   0.0223	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0166	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.1207	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.2102	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5035	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0012	   (0.66)	   0.0023	   (0.31)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0039	   (0.17)	   0.0068	   (0.01)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0035	   (0.24)	   -­‐0.0040	   (0.13)	  
Negotiation	   0.0054	   (0.07)	   -­‐0.0066	   (0.01)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0039	   (0.67)	   0.0113	   (0.15)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0864	   (0.00)	   0.7983	   (0.00)	  
Var	   0.0034	   (0.00)	   0.0026	   (0.00)	  
Covar	   0.0004	   (0.00)	  
	    N	   1935	  
	  
1935	  
	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0455	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   132.44	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0419	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   107.21	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
	  




Table	  12	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Constant	  Private	  Information	  Content	  
Table	   12	   reproduces	   results	   displayed	   in	   Table	   6	   for	   a	   sub-­‐sample	   of	   transactions	   for	  which	   the	   bidder	   level	   of	  
private	   information,	  measured	  by	   the	  price	  non-­‐synchronicity	   indicator,	   is	   almost	   constant	  between	   the	  pre	  and	  
post	  announcement	  period.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  limit	  the	  sample	  to	  transactions	  for	  which	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  bidder	  
price	   non-­‐synchronicity	   during	   the	   post	   the	   announcement	   period	   (day	   plus	   42	   to	   day	   plus	   61)	   to	   price	   non-­‐
synchronicity	  during	  the	  pre	  announcement	  period	  (from	  day	  minus	  61	  to	  day	  minus	  42)	  is	  between	  0.95	  and	  1.05.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.9183	   (0.00)	   0.0245	   (0.38)	   0.9246	   (0.00)	   0.0221	   (0.43)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1304	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0302	   (0.05)	   0.1407	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0324	   (0.04)	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   -­‐0.0737	   (0.00)	   0.0400	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0873	   (0.00)	   0.0621	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0093	   (0.00)	   0.0062	   (0.00)	   0.0088	   (0.00)	   0.0065	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   0.0023	   (0.93)	   0.0331	   (0.25)	   0.0063	   (0.81)	   0.0318	   (0.26)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0272	   (0.00)	   0.0066	   (0.32)	   -­‐0.0303	   (0.00)	   0.0073	   (0.27)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0023	   (0.64)	   0.0036	   (0.50)	   -­‐0.0030	   (0.54)	   0.0043	   (0.41)	  
All	  Stock	   0.0040	   (0.45)	   0.0270	   (0.00)	   0.0048	   (0.35)	   0.0281	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   0.0009	   (0.95)	   -­‐0.0455	   (0.01)	   0.0018	   (0.91)	   -­‐0.0415	   (0.01)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.1629	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.6632	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.1530	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.6670	   (0.00)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0079	   (0.15)	   0.0032	   (0.59)	   -­‐0.0072	   (0.18)	   0.0026	   (0.66)	  
Negotiation	   0.0051	   (0.35)	   0.0006	   (0.93)	   0.0048	   (0.37)	   0.0012	   (0.84)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0217	   (0.20)	   0.0336	   (0.07)	   -­‐0.0184	   (0.27)	   0.0336	   (0.07)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.1476	   (0.00)	   0.7551	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.1356	   (0.00)	   0.7422	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0627	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0738	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   103.61	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   110.26	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0586	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0673	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Table	  13	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  High	  probability	  of	  Completion	  Transactions	  
Table	   13	   reproduces	   results	   displayed	   in	   Table	   6	   for	   a	   sub-­‐sample	   of	   transactions	   for	   which	   the	   probability	   of	  
successful	  completion,	  as	  perceived	  by	  investors,	  is	  very	  high.	  We	  use	  the	  ratio	  of	  target	  stock	  price	  two	  days	  after	  
the	   transaction	   announcement	   to	   the	   offer	   price	   as	   measure	   of	   investors’	   perception	   of	   the	   probability	   of	  
completion.	  The	  sample	  is	  limited	  to	  transactions	  for	  which	  this	  ratio	  lies	  between	  0.975	  and	  1.025.	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   Probability	  of	  Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.9578	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0151	   (0.67)	   0.9628	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0119	   (0.73)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.0842	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0279	   (0.08)	   0.0881	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0266	   (0.09)	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   -­‐0.0485	   (0.00)	   0.0507	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0533	   (0.00)	   0.0668	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   0.0061	   (0.00)	   0.0025	   (0.13)	   0.0062	   (0.00)	   0.0027	   (0.09)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   -­‐0.0177	   (0.35)	   0.0870	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.0162	   (0.39)	   0.0847	   (0.02)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.0233	   (0.00)	   0.0144	   (0.09)	   -­‐0.0242	   (0.00)	   0.0153	   (0.07)	  
Horizontal	   -­‐0.0032	   (0.24)	   0.0022	   (0.67)	   -­‐0.0033	   (0.22)	   0.0026	   (0.60)	  
All	  Stock	   0.0056	   (0.14)	   0.0165	   (0.02)	   0.0055	   (0.14)	   0.0168	   (0.02)	  
Toehold	   -­‐0.0036	   (0.73)	   -­‐0.1218	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0036	   (0.72)	   -­‐0.1195	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.0699	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.4098	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0710	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.4136	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   -­‐0.0020	   (0.36)	   0.0044	   (0.27)	   -­‐0.0021	   (0.32)	   0.0045	   (0.26)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.0002	   (0.94)	   0.0234	   (0.00)	   0.0004	   (0.87)	   0.0228	   (0.00)	  
Initiation	   -­‐0.0041	   (0.16)	   0.0044	   (0.42)	   -­‐0.0039	   (0.17)	   0.0033	   (0.53)	  
Negotiation	   0.0019	   (0.50)	   0.0003	   (0.95)	   0.0018	   (0.51)	   -­‐0.0004	   (0.94)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   -­‐0.0072	   (0.42)	   0.0064	   (0.71)	   -­‐0.0077	   (0.40)	   0.0045	   (0.79)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.1001	   (0.00)	   0.8174	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0991	   (0.00)	   0.8081	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0388	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0418	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   67.27	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   71.71	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0335	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0349	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   44.20	   (0.00)	   	  	   	  	   44.01	   (0.00)	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Table	  14	  –	  Overbidding	  Determinants	  –	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  	  
Table	  14	  reports	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  variables	  used	  to	  study	  determinants	  of	  overbidding.	  	  The	  M&A	  sample	  is	  
a	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  sample	  describe	  in	  Section	  1.4	  and	  Table	  4,	  composed	  of	  805	  transactions	  for	  which	  we	  have	  been	  
able	   to	   collect	   the	   necessary	   information.	   Variables	   are	   defined	   in	   Appendix	   B.	  Mean	   is	   the	   arithmetic	   average,	  
Median	  the	  corresponding	  median,	  Stdev,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  mean	  and	  #Deals,	  the	  number	  of	  deals.	  For	  
dummy	  variables,	  the	  mean	  corresponds	  to	  the	  percentage	  of	  observations	  with	  value	  one	  in	  the	  sample.	  
	  
Variables	   Mean	   Median	   Stdev	   #Deals	  
Deal	  FOC	   -­‐0.0420	   -­‐0.0424	   0.0051	   805	  
Bidder	  Size	   29,100,000.00	   6,967,362.00	   56,300,000.00	   805	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   0.06	   0.04	   0.08	   805	  
Relative	  Size	   0.18	   0.08	   0.27	   805	  
Horizontal	   39.63%	  
	  
48.94%	   805	  
Toehold	   1.37%	  
	  
11.62%	   805	  
Hostile	   1.24%	  
	  
11.08%	   805	  
Initiation	   41.86%	  
	  
49.36%	   805	  
Negotiation	   37.64%	  
	  
48.48%	   805	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   2.61%	  
	  
15.95%	   805	  
Bidder	  Past	  Performance	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   805	  
Bidder	  Variable	  Compensation	   0.81	   0.86	   0.16	   805	  
Bidder	  GIM	  index	   9.29	   9.00	   2.61	   805	  
Bidder	  Free	  Cash	  Flow	   0.09	   0.09	   0.06	   805	  
Bidder	  Leverage	   0.17	   0.14	   0.14	   805	  
Bidder	  CEO	  age	   55.66	   56.00	   6.14	   805	  
Bidder	  CEO	  Pay	  slice	   39.94%	   40.07%	   12.68%	   805	  
HT	   36.65%	  
	  
48.21%	   805	  
MANUF	   19.50%	  
	  
39.65%	   805	  
FIN	   23.23%	   	  	   42.26%	   805	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Table	  15	  –	  Overbidding	  Determinants	  –	  Multivariate	  analyses	  
Table	  15	  summarizes	  multivariate	  analyses	  of	  overbidding	  determinants.	  The	  dependent	  variable,	  Deal	  FOC,	  is	  the	  
degree	  of	  overbidding,	  obtained	  by	  estimating	  Equation	  (5).	  Column	  (1)	  reports	  results	  when	  limiting	  ourselves	  to	  
industry	  dummies.	  In	  Column	  (2),	  we	  add	  bidder	  and	  transaction	  characteristics.	  In	  Column	  (3),	  we	  replace	  industry	  
dummies	  by	  industry	  fixed	  effects	  (SIC	  3-­‐digits	  code)	  and	  add	  year	  fixed	  effects.	  And,	  finally,	  in	  Column	  (5),	  the	  full	  
specification	   results	   are	   displayed.	   Standard-­‐errors	   are	   robust	   to	   heteroskedasticity	   and	   p-­‐value	   are	   reported	  
between	   parentheses.	   	   Descriptive	   statistics	   about	   variables	   for	   the	  M&A	   sub-­‐sample	   are	   reported	   in	   Table	   14.	  
Variables	  are	  defined	   in	  Appendix	  B.	  Year	   FE	   and	  Sector	   FE	   stand	   for	   year	  and	   industy	   fixed-­‐effects	   respectively.	  
Coeff	  stands	  for	  coefficient	  and	  p-­‐val	  for	  p-­‐value.	  Adj-­‐R-­‐sq	  is	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  coefficient.	  	  
	  
	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	  
Deal	  FOC	   Deal	  FOC	   Deal	  FOC	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
HT	   -­‐0.0011	   (0.08)	   -­‐0.0010	   (0.08)	  
	    MANUF	   -­‐0.0006	   (0.38)	   -­‐0.0009	   (0.17)	  
	    FIN	   -­‐0.0008	   (0.20)	   -­‐0.0002	   (0.74)	  
	    Bidder	  Past	  	  
Performance	  
	    
-­‐0.4394	   (0.02)	   -­‐0.3975	   (0.08)	  
Bidder	  Variable	  	  
Compensation	  
	    
-­‐0.0013	   (0.39)	   -­‐0.0018	   (0.35)	  
Bidder	  GIM	  index	  
	    
-­‐0.0002	   (0.03)	   -­‐0.0002	   (0.02)	  
Bidder	  Free	  Cash	  Flow	  
	    
0.0042	   (0.36)	   0.0068	   (0.23)	  
Bidder	  Leverage	  
	    
0.0051	   (0.01)	   0.0045	   (0.06)	  
Bidder	  CEO	  age	  
	    
-­‐0.0003	   (0.89)	   -­‐0.0021	   (0.32)	  
Bidder	  CEO	  Pay	  slice	  
	    
0.0026	   (0.17)	   0.0031	   (0.17)	  
Bidder	  Size	  
	    
0.0000	   (0.87)	   0.0000	   (0.87)	  
Target	  Industry	  	  
Liquidity	  
	    
-­‐0.0030	   (0.26)	   -­‐0.0028	   (0.44)	  
Relative	  Size	  
	    
-­‐0.0021	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.0023	   (0.02)	  
Horizontal	  
	    
-­‐0.0007	   (0.07)	   -­‐0.0007	   (0.14)	  
Toehold	  
	    
0.0083	   (0.00)	   0.0072	   (0.01)	  
Hostile	  
	    
0.0255	   (0.00)	   0.0247	   (0.00)	  
Initiation	  
	    
-­‐0.0004	   (0.35)	   -­‐0.0004	   (0.38)	  
Negotiation	  
	    
0.0010	   (0.03)	   0.0010	   (0.04)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	  
	    
-­‐0.0015	   (0.34)	   -­‐0.0022	   (0.22)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0433	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0411	   (0.00)	  





	  Sector	  FE	   no	   	  	   no	   	  	   yes	   	  	  













Table	  16	  –	  Overbidding	  Determinants	  –	  CEO	  Narcissism	  
Table	   16	   reports	   multivariate	   analyses	   of	   overbidding	   determinants	   including	   CEO	   Narcissism.	   We	   use	   CEO	  
narcissism	   first	  pronoun	   indicator	   (the	  proportion	  of	   first	  person	  singular	  pronoun	   to	   first	  person	  plural	  pronoun	  
used	  by	  CEO	   in	  CEO	   speech	   transcripts)	   as	  measure	  of	  CEO	  Narcissism,	   as	   in	  Aktas	   et	   al.	   (2016).	  Out	  of	   the	  805	  
transactions	  for	  which	  we	  have	  the	  necessary	  information	  (see	  Table	  15),	  using	  de	  Bodt	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  extended	  data	  
set,	   we	   obtain	   the	   CEO	   indicator	   for	   174	   transactions.	   The	   dependent	   variable,	   Deal	   FOC,	   is	   the	   degree	   of	  
overbidding,	   obtained	   by	   estimating	   Equation	   (5).	   Column	   (1)	   reports	   results	   when	   limiting	   ourselves	   to	   CEO	  
narcissism.	  In	  Column	  (2),	  we	  add	  industry	  dummies.	  In	  Column	  (3),	  we	  complement	  Column	  (2)	  specification	  with	  
bidder	  and	  transaction	  characteristics.	  And,	   finally,	   in	  Column	  (4),	  we	  keep	  bidder	  and	  transaction	  characteristics	  
but	  exclude	  industry	  dummies.	  Standard-­‐errors	  are	  robust	  to	  heteroskedasticity	  and	  p-­‐value	  are	  reported	  between	  
parentheses.	   	  Variables	  are	  defined	   in	  Appendix	  B.	  Year	  FE	  and	  Sector	  FE	  stand	  for	  year	  and	   industy	  fixed-­‐effects	  
respectively.	  Coeff	  stands	  for	  coefficient	  and	  p-­‐val	  for	  p-­‐value.	  Adj-­‐R-­‐sq	  is	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  coefficient.	  	  
	  
 
Deal	  FOC	   Deal	  FOC	   Deal	  FOC	   Deal	  FOC	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Narcissism	   -­‐0.0068	   (0.20)	   -­‐0.0076	   (0.16)	   -­‐0.0073	   (0.17)	   -­‐0.0085	   (0.27)	  
HT	  
	    
0.0008	   (0.49)	   0.0001	   (0.92)	  
	    MANUF	  
	    
0.0010	   (0.46)	   0.0005	   (0.74)	  
	    FIN	  
	    
0.0011	   (0.44)	   0.0005	   (0.79)	  
	    Bidder	  Past	  	  
Performance	  
	      
-­‐0.2641	   (0.68)	   -­‐0.1986	   (0.84)	  
Bidder	  Variable	  Compensation	  
	      
0.0022	   (0.59)	   0.0025	   (0.63)	  
Bidder	  GIM	  index	  
	      
-­‐0.0002	   (0.36)	   -­‐0.0001	   (0.61)	  
Bidder	  Free	  Cash	  Flow	  
	      
0.0017	   (0.89)	   -­‐0.0022	   (0.93)	  
Bidder	  Leverage	  
	      
-­‐0.0013	   (0.77)	   -­‐0.0026	   (0.74)	  
Bidder	  CEO	  age	  
	      
-­‐0.0021	   (0.65)	   -­‐0.0007	   (0.92)	  
Bidder	  CEO	  Pay	  slice	  
	      
-­‐0.0014	   (0.77)	   -­‐0.0018	   (0.74)	  
Bidder	  Size	  
	      
-­‐0.0006	   (0.22)	   -­‐0.0001	   (0.88)	  
Target	  Industry	  	  
Liquidity	  
	      
0.0016	   (0.58)	   0.0008	   (0.86)	  
Relative	  Size	  
	      
-­‐0.0049	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.0035	   (0.11)	  
Horizontal	  
	      
-­‐0.0008	   (0.38)	   -­‐0.0014	   (0.19)	  
Toehold	  
	      
0.0085	   (0.21)	   0.0020	   (0.80)	  
Hostile	  
	      
0.0249	   (0.00)	   0.0216	   (0.00)	  
Initiation	  
	      
0.0004	   (0.63)	   -­‐0.0006	   (0.61)	  
Negotiation	  
	      
0.0012	   (0.20)	   0.0014	   (0.21)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	  
	      
-­‐0.0008	   (0.70)	   -­‐0.0007	   (0.81)	  
_cons	   -­‐0.0424	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0430	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0233	   (0.25)	  







	  Sector	  FE	   no	   	  	   no	   	  	   no	   	  	   yes	   	  	  







	  R-­‐sq	   0.009	   	  	   0.013	   	  	   0.235	   	  	   0.168	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Table	  17	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  Failed	  Transactions	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  	  
Table	   17	   reports	   the	   same	   descriptive	   statistics	   as	   in	   Table	   5.	   Selected	   variables	   are	   the	   ones	   used	   to	   estimate	  
Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  with	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  regression	  (SUR)	  estimator	  and	  to	  test	  Equation	  (5),	  the	  first-­‐order	  
condition	  of	  the	  bidder’s	  expected	  profit	  maximization.	   	  With	  respect	  to	  Table	  5,	  SEC	  filings	  variables,	  most	  often	  
not	   available	   for	   failed	   transaction,	   are	   excluded.	   The	   sub-­‐sample	   of	   failed	   transactions	   comes	   from	   the	   M&A	  
sample	   presented	   in	   Table	   1.	   Among	   the	   5,780	   transactions,	   1,152	   are	   failed	   and	   for	   545	   of	   them,	   information	  
necessary	  to	  compute	  variables	  needed	  to	  the	  estimate	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  are	  available.	  	  Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  
Appendix	  B.	  Mean	   is	  the	  arithmetic	  average,	  Median	   the	  corresponding	  median,	  Stdev,	   the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  
the	  mean.	  p-­‐val	  reports	  the	  p-­‐value	  of	  the	  standard	  test	  of	  sample	  mean	  statistical	  significance.	  
	  
	  	   Failed	  deals	  -­‐	  545	  deals	  
Variable	   Mean	   p-­‐val	   Median	   Stdev	  
Bidder	  CAR	   -­‐0.99%	   (0.04)	   -­‐0.82%	   11.24%	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	   -­‐6.55%	   (0.08)	   -­‐1.07%	   86.29%	  
Target	  CAR	   16.95%	   (0.00)	   13.02%	   21.53%	  
Deal	  CAR	   2.89%	   (0.00)	   2.53%	   9.20%	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   7.49%	   (0.01)	   3.56%	   66.88%	  
Target	  Runup	   3.63%	   (0.00)	   3.03%	   22.41%	  
Probability	  of	  Success	   74.73%	  
	  
83.33%	   22.28%	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   35.05%	  
	  
31.25%	   40.53%	  
Bidder	  Size	   6,389,036	  
	  
740,001	   30,600,000	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   0.0627	  
	  
0.0369	   0.0970	  
Relative	  Size	   64.15%	  
	  
40.28%	   100.82%	  
Horizontal	   42.20%	  
	  
0.00%	   49.43%	  
All	  Stock	   32.84%	  
	  
0.00%	   47.01%	  
Toehold	   10.46%	  
	  
0.00%	   30.63%	  
Hostile	   14.68%	  
	  
0.00%	   35.42%	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0572	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0001	   0.3658	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   0.1087	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.1415	   0.9600	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   26.24%	   	  	   0.00%	   44.03%	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Table	  18	  –	  Bidder’s	  Expected	  Profit	  Maximization	  Test	  –	  SUR	  Results	  for	  Failed	  Transactions	  
Table	  18	  replicates	  Table	  6	  SUR	  results	  for	  the	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  failed	  transactions	  introduced	  in	  Table	  17.	  Estimations	  
of	   Equations	   (3)	   and	   (4)	   are	   obtained	   using	   the	   seemingly	   unrelated	   regression	   (SUR)	   estimator.	   p-­‐values	   are	  
reported	  between	  parentheses.	   	  Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  Coeff	  stands	  for	  coefficient	  and	  p-­‐val	   for	  p-­‐
value.	  Chi2	   is	  the	  chi-­‐squared	  statistic	  of	  the	  cross-­‐equation	  restriction	  defined	  at	  Equation	  (5)	  and	  FOC	  Test	  (FOC	  
Test	  (Wang)	  uses	  Wang	  (2015)	  costs	  of	  failure	  estimate	  and	  FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu),	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  one),	  the	  
corresponding	  point	  estimate.	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  present	  results	  for	  the	  raw	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premium,	  while	  Columns	  
(3)	   and	   (4)	   report	   corresponding	   results	   using	   the	  winsorized	   8-­‐week	   bid	   premium	   (winsorization	   is	   at	   one	   and	  
ninety-­‐nine	  percentiles).	  In	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (3),	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  (we	  follow	  Bhagat	  
et	  al.	  (2005)	  probability	  scaling	  method)	  and	  in	  Columns	  (2)	  and	  (4),	  it	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  deal	  completion.	  	  
	  
	  	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	   8-­‐week	  Bid	  Premium	  Winsorized	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	   Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  
Probability	  of	  
Success	  
	  	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	   Coeff	   p-­‐val	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	   0.5761	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0110	   (0.06)	   0.6620	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0104	   (0.06)	  
Target	  Runup	   0.1113	   (0.48)	   -­‐0.0304	   (0.10)	   0.1585	   (0.39)	   -­‐0.0353	   (0.08)	  
8-­‐week	  BidPremium	   -­‐0.0163	   (0.80)	   0.0391	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0402	   (0.69)	   0.0714	   (0.00)	  
Bidder	  Size	   -­‐0.0309	   (0.07)	   0.0098	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0327	   (0.08)	   0.0102	   (0.00)	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   0.3556	   (0.29)	   -­‐0.0404	   (0.31)	   0.3752	   (0.30)	   -­‐0.0429	   (0.28)	  
Relative	  Size	   -­‐0.1111	   (0.02)	   0.0144	   (0.01)	   -­‐0.1214	   (0.02)	   0.0161	   (0.00)	  
Horizontal	   0.0657	   (0.32)	   -­‐0.0006	   (0.94)	   0.0684	   (0.34)	   0.0007	   (0.93)	  
All	  Stock	   -­‐0.0211	   (0.77)	   0.0563	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.0193	   (0.80)	   0.0573	   (0.00)	  
Toehold	   -­‐0.4656	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.1948	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5168	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.1929	   (0.00)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.4426	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5018	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.4755	   (0.00)	   -­‐0.5058	   (0.00)	  
BidderPrivateR2	   0.0403	   (0.65)	   -­‐0.0093	   (0.37)	   0.0421	   (0.67)	   -­‐0.0105	   (0.32)	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   -­‐0.0050	   (0.89)	   -­‐0.0001	   (0.99)	   -­‐0.0066	   (0.86)	   -­‐0.0004	   (0.91)	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   0.0518	   (0.50)	   0.0295	   (0.00)	   0.0516	   (0.54)	   0.0297	   (0.00)	  
_cons	   0.4334	   (0.08)	   0.6640	   (0.00)	   0.4686	   (0.08)	   0.6450	   (0.00)	  







	  FOC	  Test	  (Wang)	   -­‐0.0123	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0305	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   0.07	   (0.80)	   	  	   	  	   0.16	   (0.69)	   	  	   	  	  
FOC	  Test	  (Savor	  and	  Lu)	   -­‐0.0083	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.0231	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Chi2	   0.03	   (0.86)	   	  	   	  	   0.09	   (0.76)	   	  	   	  	  




Appendix	  A	  –	  Bidder	  CAR	  and	  Overbidding	  
Assuming	  that	  bidder	  CAR	  is	  entirely	  transaction	  related	  (no	  bidder	  specific	  information	  release	  or	  other	  
sources	  of	  contamination),	  a	  negative	  bidder	  CAR	  around	  an	  M&A	  announcements	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  
conclusive	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   bidder	   overbidding.	   	   We	   show	   in	   this	   Appendix	   that	   this	   is	   not	  
necessarily	   the	   case.	  Bidders	  may	  adopt	  equilibrium	  bidding	   strategies	   generating	  negative	  CAR	   in	   the	  
presence	   of	   exit	   costs.	   We	   develop	   our	   analysis	   in	   the	   simple	   perfect	   information	   setup	   in	   order	   to	  
abstract	   away	   from	   any	   modelling	   complexity	   but	   the	   same	   argument	   can	   be	   embedded	   in	   more	  
sophisticated	  environments,	  without	  changing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  argument.	  
We	   study	   a	   strategic	   game	   of	   perfect	   information	  with	   two	   bidders,	  𝐴	  and	  𝐵,	   who	   fight	   to	   acquirer	   a	  
target	  𝑇.	   The	   target	   is	   unique.	   Buying	  𝑇	  will	   deliver	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   to	   the	   winning	   bidder	  
(denoted	  𝑆!∈ !,! )	   and	   a	   corresponding	   loss	   to	   the	  defeated	  one	   (denoted	  −𝑆!∈ !,! ).	  We	   assume	   that	  𝑆! = 𝑆! + 𝜀,	  with	  𝜀 > 0	  (𝐴	  is	   a	   stronger	   bidder	   than	  𝐵).	  𝑇	  is	   fully	   committed	   to	   sale.	   In	   case	   of	   ties,	  𝐴	  
wins	   (efficient	   allocation	   rule).	   The	   financial	   market	   is	   informationally	   efficient	   and	   the	   M&A	   is	  
unanticipated.	  	  
A	  perfect	  information	  Nash	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  game	  is	  the	  following:	  
-­‐ 𝐴	  bids	  2  ×𝑆!	  
-­‐ 𝐵  bids	  2  ×𝑆!	  
The	  outcome	  is	  that	  𝐴	  wins	  and	  pays	  (2  ×𝑆!).	  His	  profit	  is	  𝑆! −    2  ×𝑆! .	  𝐴	  has	  no	  incentive	  to	  bid	  more.	  
If	  𝐴	  bids	  less,	  he	  loses	  and	  his	  profit	   is	  −𝑆!.	  As	  long	  as	  𝑆! −    2  ×𝑆! >   −𝑆!  or	   𝑆! − 𝑆! > 0,	  which	  is	  
the	  case	  here	  by	  construction,	  he	  has	  no	   incentive	  to	  bid	   less.	  𝐵	  loses	  and	  pays	  nothing.	  B	  also	  has	  no	  
incentives	   to	   deviate.	   By	   bidding	   less,	   B	   still	   loses.	   By	   bidding	   more,	   B	   wins,	   pays	   2  ×𝑆! +   𝛿,	   with	  𝛿 > 0.	  His	  profit	  is	  𝑆!   −    2  ×𝑆! +   𝛿 ,	  or	  −𝑆! − 𝛿,	  which	  is	  more	  negative	  than	  −𝑆!.	  
Can	  this	  outcome	  generate	  negative	  CAR	  for	  bidder	  𝐴?	  It	  is	  indeed	  the	  case	  if	  𝑆! < 𝑆! < 2  𝑆!.	  Note	  	  that	  
if	  𝑆! < 2  𝑆!,	  𝑆! − 2×𝑆! < 0.	  Completing	  the	  acquisition	  generates	  a	  value	  destruction	  and	  therefore,	  
generates	  a	  negative	  CAR.	  
Note	  finally	  that	  bidder	  𝐴	  participates	  in	  the	  game	  only	  when	  there	  are	  some	  large	  fixed	  costs	  associated	  
with	  exit.	  
The	  intuition	  is	  simply	  that,	  in	  equilibrium,	  if	  exit	  is	  costly	  and	  acquisition	  opportunities	  are	  limited,	  as	  it	  
is	  frequently	  the	  case	  in	  reality,	  acquiring	  the	  target	  is	  less	  value-­‐destroying	  than	  allowing	  the	  competitor	  
to	  do	  so.	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Appendix	  B	  –	  Variable	  definitions	  
Variable	   Definition	  	   source	  
52Weeks	  High	   Target	  stock	  price	  on	  day	  minus	  42	  before	  the	  announcement	  over	  the	  
maximum	  target	  stock	  price	  observed	  during	  the	  52	  weeks	  before	  day	  
minus	  42	  
crsp	  
8Weeks	  Bid	  Premium	   Offer	  price	  divided	  by	  market	  price	  of	  the	  target	  	  42	  days	  before	  the	  
announcement	  (computed	  by	  authors)	  
crsp,sdc	  
All	  Cash	   Dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  the	  consideration	  is	  cash	  only	  and	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	  
All	  Stock	   Dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  the	  consideration	  is	  stock	  only	  and	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	  
Bidder	  CAR	   Bidder	  CAR	  over	  the	  three	  days	  event	  windows	  centered	  on	  the	  
announcement	  date,	  estimated	  with	  a	  market	  model	  and	  with	  an	  
estimation	  window	  from	  day	  minus	  250	  to	  day	  minus	  10.	  CRSP	  value	  
weighted	  index	  is	  used	  as	  proxy	  for	  the	  market	  index	  
crsp,sdc	  
Bidder	  CEO	  age	   Bidder	  CEO's	  age	  in	  year	  (logarithm	  is	  used	  in	  the	  regression)	   execucomp	  
Bidder	  CEO	  payslice	   Percentage	  of	  the	  bidder	  CEO's	  total	  pay	  (item	  TDC1)	  among	  the	  top	  five	  
executives	  as	  in	  Bebchuck	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
execucomp	  
Bidder	  Free	  Cash	  Flow	   operating	  income	  before	  depreciation	  (compustat	  item	  oibdp)	  minus	  
interest	  expense	  (compustat	  item	  tie)	  minus	  income	  tax	  (compustat	  item	  
txt)	  	  plus	  changes	  in	  deferred	  taxes	  and	  investment	  tax	  credits	  
(compustat	  item	  txditc)	  minus	  dividends	  on	  both	  preferred	  (compustat	  
item	  pdvc)	  and	  common	  share	  (compustat	  item	  cdvc)	  divided	  by	  total	  
assets	  (compustat	  item	  AT)	  
compustat	  
Bidder	  GIM	  index	   Bidder	  Gompers	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  governance	  index	   riskmetric	  
Bidder	  Leverage	   Long	  term	  debt	  (compustat	  item	  DLTT)	  divided	  by	  total	  assets	  (compustat	  
item	  AT)	  
compustat	  
Bidder	  Past	  Performance	   Abnormal	  return	  (alpha)	  obtained	  from	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  market	  
model	  estimated	  during	  the	  period	  day	  minus	  250	  to	  day	  minus	  20	  
crsp,sdc	  
Bidder	  Scaled	  CAR	  	   Bidder	  CAR	  divided	  by	  probability	  of	  success	   	  
Bidder	  Size	   Market	  value	  of	  bidder	  42	  days	  before	  announcement	  (logarithm	  is	  used	  
in	  the	  regression)	  
crsp,sdc	  
Bidder	  Variable	  Compensation	   Variable	  component	  of	  the	  bidder	  CEO's	  compensation	  :	  (item	  TDC1-­‐item	  
SALARY)/item	  TDC1	  
execucomp	  
BidderPrivateAmihud	   Relative	  variation	  of	  the	  bidder	  Amihud(2002)	  illiquidity	  ratio	  between	  
the	  pre	  (day	  minus	  61	  to	  day	  minus	  42)	  and	  the	  post	  announcement	  
period	  (day	  plus	  42	  to	  day	  plus	  61)	  
crsp,sdc	  
BidderPrivateR2	   Relative	  variation	  of	  the	  value	  of	  1-­‐R²,	  obtained	  from	  the	  estimation	  of	  
the	  market	  model,	  between	  the	  pre	  (day	  minus	  61	  to	  day	  minus	  42)	  and	  
the	  post	  announcement	  period	  (day	  plus	  42	  to	  day	  plus	  61)	  
crsp,sdc	  
CEO	  Narcissism	   CEO	  narcissism	  is	  measured	  using	  the	  I/we	  ratio	  as	  in	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2016).	  
This	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  first	  person	  singular	  (I,	  me,	  my,	  mine,	  myself)	  to	  
total	  first	  person	  pronouns	  (I,	  me,	  my,	  mine,	  myself,	  we,	  us,	  our	  ours,	  
ourselves)	  in	  CEO	  speech.	  
	  
Deal	  CAR	   Weighted	  average	  of	  BidderCAR	  and	  TargetCAR	  	  by	  market	  value	  
computed	  in	  day	  minus	  42	  
crsp,sdc	  
Deal	  Scaled	  CAR	  	   Deal	  CAR	  divided	  by	  probability	  of	  success	   	  
Deal	  FOC	   First	  order	  condition	  estimated	  value	  for	  one	  deal	  (Equation	  (5)).	  
Computation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  system	  of	  Equations	  (3)	  and	  (4).	  Table	  6,	  
Columns	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  results	  are	  used.	  This	  corresponds	  to	  results	  
obtained	  using	  the	  winsorized	  8-­‐week	  bid	  premium	  (one	  and	  ninety-­‐nine	  
percentiles),	  with	  Savor	  and	  Lu	  (2009)	  costs	  of	  failure	  estimate..	  	  
crsp,	  compustat,	  sdc	  
Deal	  success	   Dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  deal	  is	  successed	  and	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	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FIN	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  is	  in	  financial	  sector	  (sic	  code	  between	  
6000	  and	  6999)	  
	  
Horizontal	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  bidder	  and	  target	  have	  the	  same	  sic	  code	  4-­‐digit,	  0	  
otherwise	  
sdc	  
Hostile	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  deal	  is	  classified	  hostile	  by	  sdc,	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	  
HT	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  is	  in	  HT	  sector	  (Kile	  and	  Philipps	  (2009)	  
definition)	  
sdc	  
Initiation	   Dummy	  variable=	  1	  if	  the	  target	  initiated	  the	  deal,	  0	  otherwise.	   SEC	  fillings	  
Listed	  Bidder	   Dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  the	  bidder	  is	  a	  public	  firm,	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	  
MANUF	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  is	  in	  manufacturial	  sector	  (sic	  code	  
between	  2000	  and	  3999,	  HT	  sectors	  excluded)	  	  
sdc	  
Multiple	  Bidder	   Dummy	  variable=1	  if	  the	  number	  of	  bidders	  reported	  in	  SDC	  is	  greater	  
than	  one,	  0	  otherwise	  
sdc	  
Negotiation	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  selling	  procedure	  is	  a	  negotiation	  (SEC	  filings	  
indicates	  one	  buyer),	  0	  otherwise	  
SEC	  fillings	  
Nyse	  Amex	   Dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  quoted	  in	  Nyse	  or	  Amex	  
stockexchange,	  0	  otherwise	  
sdc	  
Poison	  Pill	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  target	  has	  a	  poison	  pill	  ,	  0	  otherwise	   sdc	  
Probability	  of	  success	   Fitted	  probability	  of	  success	  estimated	  from	  a	  probit	  model	  (equation	  (6))	   crsp,compustat,sdc	  
Relative	  Size	   Ratio	  of	  target	  market	  value	  computed	  on	  day	  minus	  42	  on	  bidder	  
market	  value	  computed	  in	  day	  minus	  42	  
sdc	  
Target	  CAR	   Target	  CAR	  over	  the	  three	  days	  event	  windows	  centered	  on	  the	  
announcement	  date,	  estimated	  with	  a	  market	  model	  and	  with	  an	  
estimation	  windows	  from	  day	  minus	  250	  to	  day	  minus	  10.	  CRSP	  value	  
weighted	  index	  is	  used	  as	  proxy	  for	  the	  market	  index	  
crsp,sdc	  
Target	  Industry	  Liquidity	   Schlingeman	  (2002)	  liquidity	  index.	  Ratio	  of	  the	  value	  of	  M&A	  
transactions	  in	  a	  year	  to	  the	  total	  asset	  (item	  compustat	  AT)	  of	  firms	  in	  
the	  two-­‐digit	  SIC	  code	  for	  that	  year.	  
sdc,compustat	  
Target	  Runup	   Target	  stock	  performance	  during	  the	  period	  between	  day	  minus	  42	  and	  
day	  minus	  2	  
crsp,sdc	  
Target	  Size	   Target	  market	  value	  42	  days	  before	  announcement	  (logarithm	  is	  used	  in	  
regression)	  
crsp,sdc	  
Tender	  Offer	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  deal	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  tender	  offer	  by	  sdc,	  0	  
otherwise	  
sdc	  
Toehold	   Dummy	  variable	  =	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  holds	  a	  non-­‐zero	  percentage	  target's	  
share	  before	  the	  announcement,	  0	  otherwise	  
sdc	  
Turnover	   Target	  average	  daily	  ratio	  of	  trading	  volume	  to	  total	  shares	  outstanding	  
over	  the	  52	  weeks	  before	  the	  announcement	  	  
crsp	  
Year	  1990's	   dummy	  variable	  =1	  if	  the	  deal	  is	  announced	  in	  the	  period	  1990	  to	  1999,	  0	  
otherwise	  
sdc	  
	  
